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I
INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the constitutional backwater-a place where Rupert Murdoch
and Ted Kennedy battle over the Senator's weight and the press baron's
ownership of the Boston Herald; where Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas's truthfulness before the Senate Judiciary Committee is challenged by
a D.C. Circuit insider; where a regulatory agency hopes its constitutional
arguments will be rejected in court and respected in Congress; where President
Ronald Reagan alternatively abides by and disregards Department of Justice
constitutional interpretations; where President George Bush's regulatory
appointees and Solicitor General openly battle each other before the Supreme
Court; and where members of Congress perceive constitutional analysis as
superfluous. Welcome to the world of the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") circa 1982-1992.
The story begins with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan. Advocating the
substitution of marketplace efficiencies for bureaucratic failures,' Reagan
appointed communications free-marketeers Mark Fowler (1981-1987) and Dennis
Patrick (1987-1989) to chair the FCC. This changing of the guard, to no one's
surprise, did not sit well with the FCC's pro-regulation oversight committees in
the Congress, particularly in the House.2 What is surprising is the vehemence
in which congressional leadership expressed its displeasure with the FCC, and the
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ways in which the Commission sought to advance its deregulatory agenda in the
face of countervailing legislative pressures.
This struggle between the FCC and Congress was so fierce during the Reagan
years that George Bush's efforts to soothe FCC-congressional relations by
naming less confrontational, less ideological nominees accomplished next to
nothing.' With the election of Bill Clinton to the White House and his naming
of Democrat Reed Hundt to chair the FCC, this decade-old war between the
Commission and its oversight committees appears to be at an end. This article
focuses on the struggle that preceded this promised (if not promising) era of
placidity. This retrospective is far from nostalgic; to the contrary, it provides a
revealing look at the uses and abuses of constitutional interpretation by an
independent agency in its efforts to advance its (de)regulatory agenda.
The FCC saw the Constitution as a political tool to support its deregulatory
agenda. When political circumstances allowed the FCC to invoke the Constitu-
tion to support its political agenda, the FCC paid homage to the supreme law of
the land. When the political costs of advancing its constitutional interpretation
were high, the FCC did not abide by its constitutional scruples. The Reagan and
Bush White Houses behaved much the same. Fairness doctrine legislation was
vetoed by Reagan on constitutional grounds, but constitutional concerns were
never raised by Reagan in his approval of race and gender preferences. The
Bush White House purposefully selected FCC Commissioners who disavowed
Bush Justice Department constitutional interpretations. Congress's approach to
constitutional decisionmaking was more cavalier than that of either the FCC or
the White House; Congress was simply unimpressed with and untroubled about
constitutional interpretation. Congress did not even pay lip service to
constitutional concerns raised by the FCC; instead, the FCC was labelled a
political malfeasant hiding behind an irrelevant constitutional subterfuge. The
courts, finally, were extraordinarily activist in overseeing the FCC: originating
FCC policymaking, demanding that the FCC articulate its decisionmaking in
constitutional terms, and scrutinizing FCC constitutional arguments. Constitu-
tional decisionmaking by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals was more readily explained by ideology than fidelity to
constitutional precedent.
This article details the features of constitutional politics involving indepen-
dent agencies through an examination of FCC efforts to repudiate regulatory
initiatives designed to facilitate diversity in broadcasting. Part II provides a brief
overview of the conflict between the deregulatory FCC and the regulatory
Congress. Parts III through VI focus on the particulars of four conflicts between
3. For a discussion of Bush Commission efforts to work with Congress, see infra part V(b). The
failure of these efforts is apparent. Energy and Commerce staffer Colin Crowell perceived FCC-Hill
relations to be as bad during the Bush Administration as the Reagan Administration. Telephone
interview with Colin Crowell (Sept. 25, 1992)[hereinafter Crowell interviews]. See also Mark Conrad,
FCC Broadcast Rules Review Continues on its Rocky Road, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 1992, at 5 ("persistent
criticism from Congress" has made Bush FCC a "wounded, weakened, and embarrassed player in the
complex communications law landscape").
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the FCC and Congress over the broadcast diversity issue, namely: (1) the FCC
repeal of the Fairness Doctrine; (2) FCC efforts to challenge the propriety of its
cross-ownership prohibition banning the joint ownership of a television station
and a newspaper in a single market; (3) Congress's successful efforts to fight off
an FCC challenge to the awarding of preferences to minority broadcasters; and
(4) the failure of the FCC and Congress to stop the judicial invalidation of
comparable preferences to women broadcasters. Part VII synthesizes the lessons
learned from these episodes, and comes to a sobering, but hardly revolutionary,
conclusion: Congress, the FCC, the White House, and the courts placed political
and ideological preferences ahead of principled constitutional decisionmaking.
II
CONGRESS V. FCC: DEFINING THE "PUBLIC TRUST"
Relations between the FCC and Congress are defined by legislative oversight,
not statutory mandate. The FCC's statutory mandate-to regulate the use of the
airwaves in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity"-is ill-defined to the
point of being meaningless.' Nearly sixty years old, this open-ended delegation
governs virtually all FCC operations. Dramatic changes in the broadcasting and
telecommunications industries have not prompted Congress to define more
precisely the reach or objectives of FCC regulation.'
This legislative inertia is neither unusual nor surprising. Congress often
prefers policymaking through oversight to avoid the pitfalls of substantive
legislation.' This reactive role in overseeing agency rulemaking is reflected in
the exponential growth of committee staff, the rise of ex parte contacts between
Congress and agency heads, the continued utilization of legislative vetoes (even
after Chadha), and the use of riders in appropriations legislation to stifle
disfavored agency initiatives.'
Congress-FCC relations are very much defined by these oversight controls.
Indeed, Congress protects vigilantly and has acted to expand its oversight
prerogatives and its influence over the Commission. In 1981, for instance,
Congress replaced the FCC's permanent authorization with biennial authoriza-
4. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
5. See Glenn 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 173-79 (1978); JOHN A. FREEJOHN & CHARLES R. SHIPAN,
CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: A CASE STUDY OF TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS POLICY IN CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393,393-97 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer
eds., 4th ed. 1989).
6. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REv. 207
(1984).
7. See infra notes 13-16 (ex parte contacts); Roger Davidson, The Lawmaking Congress, 56 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (Autumn 1993) (rise of committee staff); Neal Devins, Regulation of
Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto:
Invalidated It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (Autumn 1993) (persistence of post-Chadha
legislative vetoes). For a discussion of Congress's use of these devices in overseeing the FCC, see Harry
M. Sooshan III & Erwin G. Krasnow, Congress and the Federal Communications Commission: The
Continuing Contest for Power, 9 COMMENT LJ. 619 (1987).
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tions.8 Unlike permanent authorizations, where must-pass legislative action is
controlled by the Appropriations Committees, periodic authorizations enable the
FCC's oversight committees to express their preferences and criticisms through
reauthorizing legislation and not simply "annoy[ing]," "seldom... productive"
oversight hearings.9 Believing that "[r]egular and systematic oversight will
increase Commission accountability for the implementation of congressional
policy,"'" the House Telecommunications Subcommittee has more than doubled
the size of its staff since 1980 to ensure that effective use is made of this
reauthorization power.1
Congress's demand that no restrictions be placed on communications from
members of Congress to the Commission also reveals congressional efforts to
encourage FCC appreciation of the legislative will. In 1987, after the FCC
claimed that Commission rules prohibited ex parte contacts with the agency on
a matter that has been placed on the Commission's meeting agenda (the
"sunshine period"), threats and protests from Congress convinced the FCC that
the ex parte congressional contacts were supported by the "public interest for
flexibility in exchanging information among policymakers."" Congress's desire
to protect the continuous flow of information from Capitol Hill to the
Commission is understandable. Congressional communications with the FCC
have been described by former agency chairs as "powerful and persistent,"13
occurring "about as frequently as television commercials flash across the
television screen." 4  Congress jealously guards this prerogative; the White
House does not. 5 Ex parte White House contacts during the sunshine period
are forbidden.
Congressional efforts to maximize oversight authority, as well as the failure
to extend the ex parte exception to White House communications, are especially
telling. In the eyes of the FCC's congressional oversight committees, the FCC
is deemed an "arm of Congress." This belief is long held and pervasive. Witness
House Speaker Sam Rayburn's (D-TX) advice to President Kennedy's FCC
Chair Newton Minow: "Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm
8. See Sooshan & Krasnow, supra note 7, at 623-26.
9. Robinson, supra note 5, at 180.
10. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 899 (1981).
11. See Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56, 57
[hereinafter Micromanagement].
12. Ex Parte Communications and Presentations in Commission Proceedings, 2 F.C.C.R. 6053
(1987). For further discussion, see Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The
Fairness Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 76 GEO. L.J. 59, 126 n.270
(1987).
13. Richard E. Wiley, "Political" Influence at the FCC, 1988 DUKE L.J. 280, 282.
14. NEWTON N. MINOW, EQUAL TIME: THE PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
36 (1964).
15. Peter Pitch, former Chief of Staff to Mark Fowler, described the White House's indifference
to this ex parte dispute as proof positive that the executive viewed the Congress as the dominant overseer
of FCC rulemaking. Telephone Interview with Peter Pitch (Sept. 22, 1992) [hereinafter Pitch Interview].
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of the Congress; you belong to us. Remember that and you'll be alright."16
This belief still persists in congressional hearings. Senator Robert Packwood (R-
OR), for example, admonished Reagan FCC Chair Mark Fowler: "[Y]ou are a
creature of Congress and you attempt to administer ... [the] laws in accordance
with what you think Congress has intended."17 Along the same lines, Senate
Commerce Committee Chair Ernest Hollings (D-SC) warned President Bush's
FCC nominees Alfred Sikes, Andrew Barrett, and Sherrie Marshall that "[t]he
Commission must follow our lead" and that "[y]ou folks take an oath to regulate,
not deregulate." 8
Congress's view that the FCC is independent of the White House but not
Congress raises legislative expectations of FCC compliance with congressional
preferences, and thereby sets the stage for testy relations between the FCC and
its oversight committees. Richard Wiley, FCC Chair from 1974-1977, complained
of a too confrontational, too intrusive Congress desirous of using its "supervisory
tools with great regularity and enthusiasm."19 Harry Sooshan, former counsel
to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, echoed these concerns, arguing
that "[t]hroughout its. . . history, the Federal Communications Commission has
been a target of more criticism and prolonged investigation by Congress than any
other federal agency., 20 Whether, and to what degree, the Commission was
solicitous of congressional preferences is quite another matter. What is clear is
that Congress considered the Commission its own.
"Most people would agree," as former FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson
put it, "that it is a poor dog indeed that does not know its own master., 21 In
a nutshell, that is the Congress's problem with the FCC. Rather than compliant-
ly follow legislative signals, Commissioners are sometimes more attuned to the
preferences of the president who appointed them as well as their own personal
predilections. Prior to 1980, Congress remained the FCC's master (in name at
least) because of presidential indifference in the appointing of Commissioners. 22
The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan changed all that.
Reagan undertook to expand White House influence over the administrative
state while simultaneously launching a regulatory relief program designed to
eliminate cost-ineffective regulations. One of the principal tools utilized by the
Reagan Administration in advancing this deregulatory agenda was appointments
to regulatory agencies. 23 Through the appointment of like-minded individuals,
as the National Journal observed, Reagan achieved "an uncommon degree of
16. ERWIN G. KRASNOW, LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & HERBERT A. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF
BROADCAST REGULATION 89 (3d ed. 1982).
17. Joint Hearings, The Universal Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
67 (1983).
18. Congress Asserts its Dominion Over FCC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 7, 1989, at 27.
19. Wiley, supra note 13, at 282-83.
20. Harry M. Sooshan III & Erwin G. Krasnow, New Checks, Balances Affect FCC Policymaking,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1985, at 12.
21. Robinson, supra note 5, at 172.
22. Id. at 187-89.
23. See EADS & FIX, supra note 1, at 140-48.
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ideological consistency and intensity."24 At the FCC and other independent
agencies, the President relied almost exclusively on regulatory appointments to
make his influence felt.2 At the FCC, the President's influence was immediate-
ly felt.
Mark Fowler, Reagan's choice for FCC Chair, proudly proclaimed that he
was part of the Reagan deregulatory revolution. Caricaturing the FCC as "the
last of the New Deal dinosaurs" and describing himself as a "conservative
populis[t]," Fowler discerned "one clear message of the 1980 elections... dispel
this fog, the pervading environment induces not better government but bigger
government. I view my job at the Federal Communications Commission as an
important part of carrying out this mandate for a leaner, less intrusive federal
presence throughout this country."'26 Fowler's positions were echoed by fellow
Reagan appointee Dennis Patrick (who replaced Fowler as Chair in 1987). In
explaining the FCC's reliance upon marketplace forces and not regulation,
Patrick, in a not too subtle swipe at congressional regulators, observed that
"markets create the incentive to identify and to deliver to consumers what
consumers want as distinguished from what we, in Washington, think consumers
should want or should desire or what we, in Washington, think they need."'27
Congress strongly disapproved of Fowler and Patrick's free market
philosophy as well as their commitment to put that policy into place through
"unregulation." On one level, this dispute was a battle over opposing
philosophies regarding the propriety of regulation to serve the public interest.
Members of Congress such as Al Swift (D-WA), Edward Markey (D-MA), and
John Dingell (D-MI) regard broadcasters "as licensees and trustees of the public
airwaves" who may be forced to serve the public interest in exchange for the
government's granting them one of a limited number of broadcast licenses.'
Under this view, the market's inability to compel broadcasters to fulfill their
responsibilities as public trustees speaks to "the need for sound, sensible
regulations." 29 This belief that the commissioners "take an oath to regulate, not
deregulate" helps explain, as Mark Fowler put it, why it "is not possible to carry
out the Reagan program and have amicable relations with Congress. '
24. G. Calvin MacKenzie, quoted in Dick Kirschten, Team Players, 15 NAT'L. J. 385 (1983).
25. See Pitch interview, supra note 15; Telephone interview with Bruce Fein, FCC General Counsel
under Fowler (Sept. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Fein interview].
26. Mark S. Fowler, The Federal Communications Commission 1981-1987: What the Chairman Said,
10 COMM/ENT L.J. 409, 410-11, 414-15 (1988). For an academic justification of his free market
philosophy, see Mark S. Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation,
60 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1982).
27. Panel Discussion, Broadcast Deregulation: The Reagan Years and Beyond, 40 ADMIN. L. REV.
345, 353 (1988) [hereinafter Broadcast Deregulation]. See also Fowler, supra note 26, at 413.
28. Straight Talk from Chairman Dingell, BROADCASTING, Feb. 16, 1987, at 31 [hereinafter Straight
Talk]. See also Paul Starobin, FCC and Congress Clash Over Proper Roles, 1988 CONG. Q. REP. 479
(Feb. 27, 1988); Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and Partner,
1990 DuKE LJ. 967, 980-82.
29. Markey, supra note 28, at 980.
30. Micromanagement, supra note 11, at 57.
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The dispute between the FCC and the Congress, however, was not simply a
question of philosophical differences. It was also a matter of turf. Fowler,
Patrick, and other Reagan appointees did not consider themselves beholden to
Congress. "For better for worse," as Patrick pointed out, "Congress invested in
this commission a great deal of discretion to resolve public policy issues based
on public input and our interpretation of the public interest. ' 31 Congress saw
the matter otherwise. Perceiving that its "policy intent was as clear as could be,"
oversight committee members Swift, Dingell, and Markey, as well as committee
counsel Tom Cohen and Larry Irving, perceived that there was no way to "overly
manage the commission"; instead, the FCC was "a renegade agency" that needed
Congress to step in as an "active participant" and "bring them back."32
The war between Congress and the FCC took place on many fields, including
telecommunications policy associated with the AT&T divestiture, the obligations
of cable television to carry local programming, the proliferation of advertise-
ments on children's programming, the drafting of rules governing network
ownership of prime-time television, and a host of issues concerning the ability of
the marketplace to produce balanced diverse broadcasting.33  Congress,
although rarely passing new substantive legislation, successfully fought off a great
number of FCC challenges to existing regulations.' Challenges to the personal
attack and political editorializing rules were abandoned, the cross-ownership
prohibition was never formally challenged, and FCC rules governing telecommu-
nications access charges as well as network ownership of prime-time television
("fin-syn") were greatly influenced by congressional signals.35 On these matters,
the FCC sought to preserve some political capital with Congress by refusing to
fight every possible battle to the bitter end. On other matters, meanwhile, the
FCC satisfied its deregulatory appetite. It simplified the process for renewing
radio and television licenses, liberalized rules governing multiple ownership of
broadcast stations, eliminated the prohibition on trafficking in broadcast lines,
discontinued regulation of telephone data processing services, and repealed the
36fairness doctrine.
Battles between the FCC and Congress, in most respects, were not
fundamentally different from other Reagan-era squabbles over deregulation.
Agencies pushed their deregulatory agenda but retreated when politically
31. Starobin, supra note 28.
32. Micromanagment, supra note 11, at 56.
33. See Conrad, supra note 3; FREEJOHN & SHIPAN, supra note 5; Starobin, supra note 28;
Micromanagment, supra note 11, at 56.
34. Congress, on occasion, did pass legislation. See generally Sooshan & Krasnow, supra note 7
(discussing 1983 legislation). Most legislative efforts, however, focused on forcing the FCC to abandon
or modify agency-initiated proposals. See generally Bloch, supra note 12; FREEJOHN & SHIPAN, supra
note 5.
35. See generally Sooshan & Krasnow, supra note 7 (access charges); Bloch, supra note 12, at 85-89
(personal attack, political editorializing, fin-syn); Conrad, supra note 3 (fin-syn); infra text accompanying
notes 114-40 (cross-ownership).
36. See Broadcast Deregulation, supra note 27, at 345-48 (introduction by Marshall V. Berger);
Symposium, The FCC Under Chairman Fowler, 10 CoMM/ENT L.J. 405-570 (1988).
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expedient. Congressional leadership, especially in the Democratically controlled
House, screamed and shouted but rarely pursued legislative reform. Unlike
analogous battles between regulators in Congress and administrative deregulators
at the Department of Interior, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Trade
Commission, and elsewhere, a great many of the disputes between the FCC and
Congress were inextricably linked to First and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees of a free press and equal protection of the laws. This linkage was an
inevitable consequence of FCC regulations, both restricting the programming
decisions of broadcasters and promoting diversity in broadcast ownership through
race and gender preferences.
These constitutional concerns added a complex wrinkle to the resolution of
disputes between the FCC and the Congress. FCC claims that either the First
or Fourteenth Amendments prohibit broadcast regulation seem different in kind
than deregulation rooted in cost-benefit analysis. Were Congress to defer to
FCC constitutional interpretations, the Commission would have great incentive
to cloak its deregulatory agenda in high-minded constitutional rhetoric. Needless
to say, the FCC's oversight committees would concede nothing to the Commis-
sion. Instead, Congress made precisely the opposite argument, that regulation
furthers constitutional values by encouraging broadcast diversity among a limited
number of license holders. Nevertheless, the Commission had strong incentive
to raise constitutional questions, sometimes because it served its interests in
Congress and sometimes because federal court decisions would create an
opportunity for the negation of disfavored regulation. The varied ways in which
the Commission would raise doubts over the constitutional wisdom of broadcast
regulation, and the responses of Congress and the courts to the Commission's
constitutional arguments, figured prominently in defining both Commission policy
and FCC-congressional relations. These complex "constitutional dialogues" lay
at the heart of FCC challenges to the fairness doctrine, the cross-ownership
prohibition, and diversity preferences-regulations designed to facilitate balanced
and diverse broadcasting.
III
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
FCC efforts to undermine the fairness doctrine both politically and
constitutionally defined the competing visions of and relations between Congress
and the Reagan FCC. Beginning in 1981 with bully-pulpit speeches by Mark
Fowler, and ending in 1989 with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal's approval of
the FCC's repeal of the fairness doctrine,37 this epic struggle ultimately pitted
the Commission, the White House, and the federal courts against a Congress
hell-bent on preserving "public trust" regulation. The battle itself, however, was
37. One of Fowler's 1981 speeches is reprinted in Fowler, supra note 26, at 445-46. The 1989 D.C.
Circuit decision is Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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principally symbolic. Although the fairness doctrine was rarely enforced,' the
fairness battle symbolized the conflict between Congress and the Commission
over the propriety of broadcast regulation.
The fairness doctrine dates back to a 1929 decision by the Commission's
predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, holding that a radio station's public
trustee responsibilities included an affirmative obligation to make certain that a
diversity of religious, political, social, and economic viewpoints "find their way
into the market of ideas."39 This obligation of broadcasters "to encourage and
implement the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues" was formally
embraced by the FCC in 1949.' Ten years later, Congress "statutorily
approved,41 the fairness doctrine. The Congress, however, stopped short of
explicitly codifying the doctrine. In enacting legislation largely concerned with
preventing bona fide news events from triggering equal-time obligations,
Congress included a provision stating that nothing in the amendment relieved
broadcasters of their duty "to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance. '
Broadcasters challenged the constitutionality of government-imposed fairness
obligations, arguing that growth in the number of media outlets made "public
trust" regulation unnecessary, and that broadcasters should, therefore, be
accorded the same First Amendment freedoms as their brethren in the print
media. The Supreme Court settled this question in Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC, a unanimous 1969 decision that not only upheld the fairness doctrine but
defined the diminished constitutional freedoms of broadcasters. 43 The Court,
speaking through Justice White, broadly approved of the "public trustee"
rationale as a justification for limited forms of content regulation, stating that
"[tihere is nothing in the first amendment which prevents the government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, [due to technologi-
cal limits on the number of available licenses] be barred from the airwaves.""4
38. In 1980, for example, the FCC investigated only 28 of an estimated 20,000 fairness complaints,
leading one commentator to conclude that the FCC will question the broadcaster only when the
"station's position is so 'off the wall' that no reasonable person could implement it." Richard E.
Labanski, May it Rest in Peace: Public Interest and Public Access in the Post-Fairness Doctrine Era, 11
COMM/ENT 219, 231 n.40 (1989). See generally id. at 230-35; Charles D. Ferris & James A. Kirkland,
Fairness-The Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 605 (1985).
39. Mayflower Broadcasting, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
40. Editorializing by Broadcast Licenses, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
41. That is the way the Supreme Court put it in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110
n.8 (1973).
42. Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)).
43. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Scott Powe described Red Lion as "the Supreme Court's leading decision
detailing the constitutional status of broadcasting ... articulat[ing] a 'new' First Amendment, one
benefitting this 'new' method of communication." LuCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 (1987).
44. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
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Red Lion, while unanimous, had two large cracks in it. First, the Court left
open the door for revisiting its constitutional holding if the administration of
fairness were to "reduc[e] rather than enhanc[e] the volume and quality of
coverage."'4  Second, although recognizing that Congress had "ratified [the
fairness doctrine] with positive legislation," Red Lion did not specify whether the
FCC and courts should treat the doctrine as an administrative initiative or a
statutory mandate."
These two cracks lay at the heart of the battle over fairness. Congress
thought that the doctrine was codified, and perceived that fairness and other
"public trustee" regulations were necessary to combat broadcaster irresponsibili-
ty. The Commission doubted the doctrine's codification and, more significantly,
thought fairness obligations counterproductive and constitutionally vulnerable.
These Commission arguments challenged both Congress's political authority and
the propriety of most, if not all, "public trustee" regulations. The Commission
nonetheless was cautious in its challenge of fairness. The doctrine was beloved
in Congress, and Red Lion's cracks could be filled by a court ruling that fairness
was legislatively mandated and constitutionally sound. Fowler, realizing the risks
of Congress or the courts turning back a frontal assault on fairness, 47 launched
a vigorous but indirect attack on the fairness doctrine.
A. The FCC Challenges Fairness
The Commission, although suggesting in September 1981 that Congress
should reconsider fairness, did not formally question the doctrine until its May
1983 refusal to extend fairness to "teletext" systems.' Teletext was a new
technology which made use of the unused portions of broadcast signals to
transmit text and graphics (with no sounds) on television sets through a teletext
decoder. The Commission, in arguments made before the D.C. Circuit three
years later, claimed that fairness did not apply because teletext more closely
resembled the print media, where fairness-type obligations were clearly
unconstitutional, than broadcasting, and because Congress's 1959 approval of
fairness could not have extended to technologies that did not exist at that
time.49 The FCC also argued that the application of fairness would not serve
the public interest but, instead, would discourage the development of teletext and
other new technologies.0
45. Id. at 393.
46. Id. at 381-82.
47. Telephone interview with Mark Fowler, former FCC chair (Sept. 3, 1992) [hereinafter Fowler
interview].
48. Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Authorize the Transmission of Teletext, 53 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1309 (1983) [hereinafter Teletext Order].
49. Brief for Respondents at 30, Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. (TRAC) v. FCC, 801
F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1160). In Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974),
the Supreme Court rejected state efforts to extend fairness type obligations to the print media.
50. Teletext Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1324.
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The FCC's refusal to extend fairness to new technologies was little noticed
in Congress. The FCC's issuance of a May 1984 notice of inquiry to "reassess
the wisdom of applying general fairness doctrine obligations to broadcast
licensees" was quite another matter." At House and Senate oversight hearings
following this FCC announcement, Fowler was warned not to "meddle in any
way with" fairness or risk a "very vehement reaction from Congress."" "Since
the beginning of your tenure," said Senator Ernest Hollings, "you have been put
on notice not to weaken in any way the various political broadcasting laws or
rules. So that there is no misunderstanding, the Chairman should consider such
notice to be again issued." 3
Congress's admonitions were of limited value. While reaffirming the costs
of an outright repeal of fairness, the Commission nonetheless persisted in its
indirect attack of the doctrine. In August 1985, the Commission issued an
elaborate 111 page Fairness Report condemning fairness as an "unnecessary and
detrimental regulatory mechanism."'  Specifically, the Report challenged
"public trustee" regulations because electronic media properties were no longer
scarce. Furthermore, the FCC argued that the fairness doctrine no longer served
the "public interest" because it failed in its essential purpose by actually reducing
discussion of controversial issues. The Commission, accordingly, "questioned the
permissibility of the doctrine as a matter of both policy and constitutional
law.", 55
The Commission, despite these findings, "determined that it would be
inappropriate at this time to eliminate the fairness doctrine."56 This determina-
tion was ostensibly rooted in deference to Congress, namely the propriety of
legislative resolution of the issue due to the uncertainty over whether Congress
had already "mandated our retention of the fairness doctrine" caused by "the
conflicting evidence found in the record" and "the intense Congressional interest
in the fairness doctrine and the pendency of legislative [repeal] proposals., 57
The Commission, however, knew full well that Congress would never repeal
fairness. Congressmen Dingell and Timothy Wirth (D-CO) glibly remarked in
a Washington Post column that they were "consigning [the 1985 Report] to the
ash-heap."58
51. Inquiry into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licenses, 49 Fed. Reg.
20,317 (1984).
52. Federal Communications Commission Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1984).
53. Reauthorization and Oversight of the FCC: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985).
54. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985).
55. Id. at 246.
56. Id. at 247.
57. Id. at 246-47.
58. John Dingell & Timothy Wirth, The Fairness Doctrine Can Help, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1986,
at A21, col. 1.
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The FCC nevertheless launched a quiet revolution with its 1985 Report.
Clearly, the political price of direct repeal was too high. The 1985 Report,
however, set the stage for judicial repeal of the fairness doctrine. In its 1984
FCC v. League of Women Voters decision, the Supreme Court had indicated that
it would be willing to reconsider Red Lion with "some signal from Congress or
the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some
revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required."5 9 The 1985
Report paid homage to this language, quoting it to show that "the complex
constitutional issues presented by the [fairness] doctrine" cannot be settled by
"the mere recitation" of Red Lion.6° The Report's detailed conclusions on the
"exposure growth in the communications marketplace since the inception of the
fairness doctrine" sent a clear signal to the Court that it should reconsider Red
Lion.61
B. The D.C. Circuit Challenges the FCC
The significance of the 1985 Report was perceived by the FCC's reviewing
court, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.62 In a 1986 opinion written by Judge
Robert Bork reviewing the Commission's teletext ruling, the court slyly noted
that "[in a recent study of the fairness doctrine, the FCC has attempted to get
the Court to reevaluate political broadcast regulation. '63  This decision,
Telecommunications Research and Action Center ("TRAC") v. FCC, did not
address the constitutionality of fairness. Although upholding the FCC's teletext
order, the court rejected the Commission's conclusion that teletext should not be
treated as a broadcast medium. Instead, the court held that the FCC was not
obligated to apply fairness because Congress "never made the fairness doctrine
a binding statutory obligation."'  This bold conclusion, while not advanced by
59. 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.l (1984).
60. 102 F.C.C.2d at 153.
61. Id. at 202. See also id. at 202-21.
62. The role of the D.C. Circuit in overseeing the administrative state is chronicled in Symposium,
The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 507-59 (1988)
[hereinafter D.C. Circuit Symposium].
The D.C. Circuit's preeminence is attributable to Congress's granting jurisdiction to the D.C.
Circuit to handle challenges to FCC decisionmaking. Other appellate courts, however, are authorized
to resolve disputes that originate in their circuits. Consequently, fairness doctrine proponents have
sought to have other federal appellate courts reinstate the doctrine in the wake of the D.C. Circuit's
validation of the FCC's repeal of fairness. See, e.g., Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, No. 92-1115, vacated,
980 F.2d 1197 (8th Cir. 1993).
63. TRAC v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 n.5 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1986).
64. Id. at 517. This conclusion was far from inevitable. Circuit judge Abner Mikva, dissenting to
a 6-5 denial of rehearing en banc, argued that Congress "explicitly approved of, ratified and codified the
fairness doctrine" and criticized Judge Bork for denigrating the "primacy of Congress as policy-maker"
simply because he thought the policy "in error." TRAC v. FCC, No. 85-1160, slip op. 1, 5 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 16, 1986) (Mikva, J., dissenting). Mikva's attack was prompted, in part, by Bork's comment that
fairness "has come under much well-placed criticism for some time and from many quarters." TRAC,
801 F.2d at 509 n.5.
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the FCC, was certainly welcomed by the Commission.' It paved the way for
the repeal of fairness in two distinct ways. First, litigants, the Commission, or
both, could claim that it would be inappropriate to enforce an administrative
doctrine contrary to the public interest. Second, fairness could now be nullified
on "public interest" grounds rather than on the constitutional infirmity of an act
of Congress as well as a Supreme Court decision.
Direct FCC repeal of fairness remained too costly. In fact, a legislative
report (practically, if not technically, binding) accompanying the FCC's fiscal
year 1986 appropriations barred the Commission from eliminating or modifying
fairness for that fiscal year.66 Congress's intent that the "Commission shall not
change the regulations concerning the fairness doctrine" was also expressed in
Congress's statutory demand that the FCC "consider alternative means of
administration and enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine and report to the
Congress."67 If it had ignored these pro-fairness sentiments and repealed the
doctrine on its own initiative, the FCC would have flouted Congress's will and
incurred severe legislative retribution.
The FCC's solution was to craft a litigation strategy so confounding,
unprincipled, and politically motivated that the D.C. Circuit, in separate opinions,
described it as "curious" and "puzzling."'  One case, Meredith Corporation v.
FCC, involved a broadcaster's challenge to a 1984 FCC finding that Meredith
Broadcasting had violated the fairness doctrine by refusing to broadcast
programming in response to a series of ads supporting construction of a nuclear
power plant near Syracuse, New York.69 Meredith, not shockingly, claimed that
the 1985 Fairness Report eviscerated the doctrine and, consequently, the FCC
should formally repeal the doctrine and clear Meredith of any wrongdoing. The
FCC opposed Meredith's claim on standing grounds. Noting that no sanctions
were imposed because Meredith brought itself into compliance with the doctrine,
the FCC argued that Meredith had not suffered, nor was it likely to suffer, any
injury in fact from the FCC's application of fairness.7" The second case, Radio-
Television News Directors Association ("R- TNDA") v. FCC, involved arguments
by a coalition of broadcasters that "in light of the Commission's [1985 Fairness
Report] finding that the fairness doctrine has a chilling effect on the [F]irst
[A]mendment activities of broadcasters, it is important that the Court now
consider the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine.' 71 The Commission,
65. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50 (describing FCC arguments in TRAC). Commission
staff clearly understood TRAC to lay the groundwork for either the judicial or administrative repeal of
fairness. Pitch interview, supra note 15.
66. S. REP. No. 150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1985).
67. The alternatives mandate can be found in 132 CONG. REC. H10619 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
Congress's intent can be found in H.R. REP. No. 90-1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 132
CONG. REC. H10720 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
68. Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n ("R-TNDA") v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860, 862 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 868 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
69. 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984).
70. Respondent's Brief at 13-18, Meredith, No. 85-1723.
71. R-TNDA, 809 F.2d at 862.
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while refusing to repeal fairness on its own initiative, heartily endorsed this effort
to compel judicial eradication of the doctrine. Noting that the doctrine
"generally aggrieves all broadcasters as well as not serving the public interest,"
the Commission opposed intervenor efforts to dismiss the case on jurisdictional
grounds.72
The logic of the Commission's curious posturing was purely political. As the
FCC's general counsel, Jack Smith, noted at oral argument in Meredith, "we are
not talking law school enforcement, legal textbook arguments; we're talking
political reality here., 73 In other words, as the D.C. Circuit observed in its
Meredith opinion, "[i]t is patently obvious that because of non-legislative
expressions of congressional concern, the Commission does not wish to weaken
enforcement of the fairness doctrine-at least in the absence of a judicial opinion
that directs that course.', 74  Since Meredith's claim was that the Commission
should itself repeal fairness, the FCC argued that Meredith had no standing.
That, in the Commission's words, "Meredith makes a persuasive case that the
Fairness Doctrine generally aggrieves broadcasters based on serious constitution-
al questions raised by its operation" was irrelevant; no standing, after all, was no
standing.75  Conversely, since the broadcaster's association sought judicial
invalidation of fairness, the Commission supported court action.
The D.C. Circuit would have none of these political shenanigans. In R-
TNDA, the court agreed with the intervenors' claim that the 1985 Report did not
constitute agency action subject to direct challenge in the D.C. Circuit and,
accordingly, dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction.76 In Meredith, the
court ruled that Meredith "unquestionably ha[d] standing" since the FCC's
fairness finding could be used against Meredith in a license renewal hearing.'
More significantly, the Meredith court took the Commission to task. Writing for
the court, Judge Laurence Silberman first blithely observed that the Commission
must not have believed fairness was codified when it issued its 1985 Report;
"otherwise, it would have been irresponsible for the Commission gratuitously to
cast constitutional doubt on a congressional command., 78 Judge Silberman then
attacked the Commission for its political cowardice, observing that "we are aware
of no precedent that permits a federal agency to ignore a constitutional challenge
to the application of its own policy merely because the resolution would be
72. Respondent's Brief at 17, Meredith, No. 85-1723 (discussing FCC's position in R-TNDA). In
R-TNDA, the Commission characterized its 1985 Report as "a final action to which the Commission does
not intend to return in the foreseeable future." Brief for FCC on Jurisdiction at 6, R-TNDA No.85-1691.
For further discussion, see Bloch supra note 12, at 126 n.270.
73. Meredith, 809 F.2d at 873.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Respondent's Brief at 23, Meredith, No. 85-1723 (emphasis supplied).
76. 809 F.2d 860, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987). For additional discussion of R-TNDA, see Bloch, supra
note 12, at 134 n.285.
77. Meredith, 809 F.2d at 869.
78. Id. at 872.
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politically awkward."79  Accordingly, the Commission was instructed to
consider, on remand, Meredith's constitutional arguments.
The FCC may not have asked for the Meredith remand, but they very much
welcomed it. With the court order that the FCC resolve constitutional challenges
to fairness, the Commission told Congress that it was forced to definitively
resolve Meredith's fairness challenge.' The Commission could not hide its
anxiousness to settle the fairness issue. It instituted a rulemaking proceeding to
consider the Meredith remand on January 23, 1987, despite the fact that the D.C.
Circuit had not yet considered a request for a rehearing en banc.8" Ironically,
the very next month, the FCC also began work on its congressionally assigned
task of exploring alternatives to the fairness doctrine.'
C. The Congress Challenges the FCC
The D.C. Circuit's remand of Meredith was a stinging defeat for fairness
proponents. The 1985 Fairness Report left little doubt as to what the FCC
would do in its remand proceeding. Backed into a corner, Congress was forced
to either statutorily mandate or abandon fairness. Congress chose the former
tack. First, to stall the FCC's repeal of fairness and, thereby, buy the Congress
time to codify the doctrine, the FCC's House oversight committee wrung a
promise from FCC Chair Fowler that "we will not decide the Meredith case
before we bring in our [fairness alternatives] report to the Congress."83 Second,
free-standing legislation to codify the doctrine, the Fairness in Broadcasting Act,
was put on the legislative "fast track"-introduction in March, hearings in April,
completion of House and Senate committee action in May, approval in both
houses of Congress and presentment to the President in June."
Congress framed its efforts here in terms of good public policy and the
reaffirmation of legislative control over broadcasting. Senate Commerce Chair
Hollings, when introducing the measure, spoke of the FCC's "astounding,"
"relentless and misguided vendetta against the Fairness Doctrine."'  House
Commerce Chair Dingell was even more blunt in attacking the FCC for "tak[ing]
a provision that has been settled for many years and simply proceed[ing] to
79. Id. at 874.
80. See Honeymoon Over; Impending FCC Action on Fairness Irks Congress, 7 COMM. DAILY 147,
July 31, 1987, at 1 [hereinafter Honeymoon Over].
81. The Commission rulemaking was initiated on January 23, 1987, one week after the Meredith
decision. Order Requesting Comment, 2 F.C.C.R. 794 (1987). As Senator Hollings observed, "the FCC
was under no mandate of the court to begin its inquiry in such a short time. In fact, the Meredith
decision [was] not even effective." 133 CONG. REC. S3130 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1987).
82. Report of the Commission, 2 F.C.C.R. 5272 (1987).
83. Honeymoon Over, supra note 80.
84. For stories on Congress's consideration and approval of this legislation, see Senate Approves
Bill to Codify FCC's Fairness Doctrine, BNA Daily Rpt. for Exec., April 22, 1987 at A-3; House Energy
and Commerce Committee Approves Legislation to Codify FCC's Fairness Doctrine, BNA Daily Rpt. for
Exec., May 14, 1987, at A-1; Fairness Doctrine on its Way to White House, BROADCASTING, June 8, 1987,
at 33.
85. 133 CONG. REc. S3130 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
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disregard it without any cogent or visible reason . . . ."' Dingell warned that
"that kind of action carries with it certain real perils," for "Congress is a very
large and immensely powerful, rather slow moving, but absolutely irresistible
body when it finally starts moving."' s These comments reveal that congressio-
nal leadership perceived its institutional prestige to be on the line in the battle
over fairness.
These concerns of power overshadowed Congress's assessment of both the
constitutional appropriateness of "public trustee" regulations on broadcast speech
and the continued viability of Red Lion's constitutional analysis. At the same
time, congressional hearings and member statements at conference and on the
floor took issue with the Commission's conclusion that fairness squelched the
presentation of diverse perspectives of controversial issues and, therefore, no
longer served the public interest. "Without the fairness doctrine," as Chairman
Dingell put it, "discussion of public affairs could become either one-sided or be
reduced to a bland, uniform pablum as broadcasters react to economic pressures
from commercial advertisers ... ."' Consequently, emphasizing that "the
public interest standard established in the context of broadcasting means that
broadcasters are public trustees with unique responsibilities,"'  Congress
overwhelmingly approved of fairness legislation (59-31 in the Senate; 302-102 in
the House). Congress's unwavering, unquestioning support of Red Lion made
clear that Capitol Hill took as a given what the FCC's marketplace approach
towards the First Amendment hotly disputed. For Congress, broadcasters are
not part of the First Amendment press; broadcasters, instead, are subject to
regulations, including content-based restrictions, which are believed to serve,
though not proven to serve, the "public interest."
Congress's willingness to put the Commission in its place through fairness
legislation did not end the issue, however. White House acquiescence was also
necessary. President Reagan, however, strongly opposed fairness and unhesitat-
ingly followed a Department of Justice recommendation that he veto the fairness
bill as "antagonistic to the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment."'  Reagan's veto message flatly rejected public trustee regulations
in favor of full First Amendment rights for broadcasters. "In any other medium
besides broadcasting," Reagan contended, "such federal policing of the editorial
86. Straight Talk, supra note 28, at 33.
87. Id.
88. Codification of Fairness Doctrine Appears Imminent, BROADCASTING, April 13, 1987, at 78.
89. Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 742 before the Subcomm. on Communica-
tions of the Senate Comm on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987)
(statement of former FCC chair Charles D. Ferris).
90. Veto of Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 715 (June 29,
1987) [hereinafter Veto message]. This message is in accord with the Justice Department's conclusion
that fairness frustrates the "purpose of the First Amendment," namely, "to help assure that the people
are adequately informed about public issues, not to assure they are adequately informed by one
particular medium or group of media." Justice's View on the Fairness Doctrine Bill, BROADCASTING,
Apr. 27, 1987, at 33.
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judgment of journalists would be unthinkable." 91 The President's veto did not
catch Congress by surprise; the strength of his anti-fairness convictions did. A
former broadcaster, Reagan described radio as "an effective, efficient medium
that has adapted to changes in society and technology,"' and proudly spoke of
"earning my living exercising my First Amendment rights."'  Following the
veto (and Congress's inability to launch a serious override effort), fairness
proponents sought to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat by including the
fairness doctrine within a $600 billion catch-all spending bill for fiscal year
1988.9' Reagan, however, stood firm. He conditioned his signing of the
spending bill on Congress's exclusion of fairness.95 Congress, to the chagrin of
fairness supporters, blinked, and future codification efforts never got off the
ground during the Reagan and Bush Administrations.'
D. The FCC Repeals Fairness
The writing of the fairness doctrine repeal was certainly on the wall during
the fight between Congress and the White House over the 1987 Fairness in
Broadcasting Act. One month after the President's successful veto of that bill,
on August 4, 1987, the FCC (with Dennis Patrick now at the helm) ended what
little suspense remained by voting unanimously to abolish the fairness doctrine.
The Commission, reaffirming its 1985 Fairness Report, judged the doctrine to be
unconstitutional and opposed to the public interest.'
The Commission's opinion, while expected, held a few surprises. Unlike the
1985 Report, which was formally limited to the public interest issue, the 1987
repeal was framed in constitutional terms. This finding went beyond the
Meredith remand which noted that "the Commission need not confront [the
constitutional] issue" if it finds the doctrine "contrary to the public interest."98
The Commission reached out to decide the constitutional issue for strategic
reasons. Knowing that its repeal would be challenged in court, the Commission
wanted to set the stage for a court ruling that fairness was unconstitutional."
91. Veto message, supra note 90.
92. Ronald Reagan, A Presidential Perspective on Radio, BROADCASTING, Sept. 8, 1986, at 22.
93. The President vs. the Fairness Doctrine, BROADCASTING, June 29, 1987, at 29.
94. See "The Rise and Fall of the Fairness Doctrine," Part III: The President Stands Firm,
BROADCASTING, Dec. 28, 1987 at 31.
95. See id.; Neal Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing
Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 398.
96. Energy Commerce Chair Dingell reintroduced fairness legislation in 1989. Although originally
included in the fiscal year 1990 appropriations package, the provision was unceremoniously dropped in
bill negotiations. See Jackie Calmes, Bush, Congress Reach Deal on Deficit-Reduction Bill, 47 CONG.Q. WKLY. Nov. 25, 1989, at 3221. With Clinton in the White House, Congress may well reenact the
fairness doctrine. The Fairness in Broadcasting Act was introduced in the Senate on February 4, 1993
and in the House on May 5, 1993. The fairness doctrine was also folded into campaign reform legislation
approved by the Senate on June 30, 1993. See Bill Holland, FCC Rules on Share Data,; Fairness Doctrine
on Hold, BILLBOARD, July 31, 1993, at 66.
97. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).
98. Meredith Corporation v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874.
99. Pitch interview, supra note 15; Fowler interview, supra note 47.
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Indeed, to make it impossible for a court to extricate the Commission's public
interest determination from its constitutional analysis, Commission General
Counsel Diane Killory argued "that any policy justifications are so intertwined
with constitutional implications that we cannot separate the two."'n Such a
constitutional ruling would foreclose legislative reform and, equally important,
drive a stake into the heart of public trustee regulations.
The 1987 repeal was also surprising because it contained a vitriolic attack of
Justice White's Red Lion decision. The Commission was not content to
challenge the factual predicates of spectrum scarcity and broadcaster diversity
which underlay Red Lion. Although making that argument, the heart of the
fairness repeal was a frontal assault on Red Lion's public trustee-rooted
differentiation of the print and broadcast press's First Amendment rights. For
the Commission, "[t]he reasons for proscribing government intrusion into the
editorial discretion of print journalists provide the same basis for proscribing
such interference into the editorial discretion of broadcast journalists. The First
Amendment was adopted to protect the people.
01
The fairness repeal, without more, would have triggered a ferocious
legislative panning of the Commission. In addition to the repeal, the Commis-
sion, contrary to its stated understanding with Congress, did not release its
congressionally mandated study of alternatives to fairness prior to its resolution
of the Meredith remand. Instead, on the day it repealed fairness, it issued its
alternatives report, informing Congress that no fairness alternative "is preferable
to eliminating [the] doctrine entirely.''"" 2  Congress's response to the
Commission's willingness to couple insult with injury was a tirade of unsurpassed
venom. The Commission's timing was labelled tricky "in the Nixonian sense,"
"a thinly veiled attempt to end-run Congress.""0 3 The Commission's decision
on fairness was characterized as "wrongheaded, misguided, and illogical,"
"unconscionable," "craven," "a plain and simple outrage," "pure nonsense," and
"crap."" Finally, relations between Congress and the Commission had
deteriorated into "crisis," with the FCC being labelled as "untrustworthy,"
"totally out of control," and "lickspittles." 10
5
100. Fight with Congress Assumed; FCC Declares Fairness Doctrine Unconstitutional, COMM. DAILY,
Aug. 5, 1987, at 1.
101. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. at 5057.
102. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 5272
(1987).
103. Eleanor Randolph, FCC Scraps "Fairness Doctrine"; Angry Hill Chairmen Consider Response,
WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1987, at A-i; Bob Davis, FCC Abolishes Fairness Doctrine, Arousing Debate, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 5, 1987, at 8, col. 3.
104. These legislator quotes can be found in The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, BROADCASTING, Aug.
10, 1987, at 59; Tom Shales, The FCC, On the Attack, Against Fairness, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1987, at
C-i; Swift Disputes View; Dennis Tells Fate of Fairness Doctrine Rests on Industry Performance, COMM.
DAILY, Sept. 22, 1987, at 3.
105. These legislator quotes can be found in, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 104;
Shales, supra note 104; Broadcast Bill Ready, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 24, 1987, at 4.
[Vol. 56: No. 4
Page 145: Autumn 1993] SEARCH FOR THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE
The FCC's repeal received a better reception in court. Seeking to kill
fairness now and forever, the Commission asked the court of appeals to
invalidate fairness on both constitutional and public interest grounds.1°6 In
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, the court granted half of this request, approving
the Commission repeal on public interest grounds without considering the
constitutional question." 7 That Meredith explicitly invited the Commission to
live up to its oath to "defend the Constitution" by passing on the constitutional-
ity of fairness was now irrelevant. Noting that "American courts are not to pass
upon a constitutional question... if there is also some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of," the court "[h]appily" ducked the constitutional
question." s Under this approach, fairness was indeed repealed but Red Lion
remained intact, as did Congress's ability to statutorily mandate fairness."
Moreover, this ruling did not call into question the Commission's power to
administratively reinstate fairness.
E. Summary
The repeal of the fairness doctrine was the result not of a bold regulatory
agency initiative, but of a series of complex political and judicial interactions.
Only the wildest speculation on the part of the Commission could have predicted
the outcome of the series of court decisions, legislative initiatives, and White
House responses. The FCC, however, deserves extraordinary credit (or blame)
for pushing the repeal of fairness while simultaneously seeking to avoid a head-
on confrontation with Congress. In the end, this dual pursuit proved impossible.
Congress would not let the FCC have it both ways. For the FCC, once it
released the 1985 Fairness Report, a chain of events outside its control had been
triggered and there was no going back.
The role of constitutional interpretation in these fairness wars is rather
peculiar. The Constitution seemed at once central and ancillary to the resolution
of this dispute. The FCC was rather selective in its invocation of the Constitu-
tion. Prior to its repeal of fairness, the FCC spoke only of "constitutional
doubts" in its 1985 Fairness Report and D.C. Circuit arguments. This
106. Pitch interview supra note 15. See also Respondent's Brief, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (No. 87-1516).
107. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 657.
108. Id. at 657, 659. Judge-and later Bush Solicitor General-Kenneth Starr would have reached
the constitutional issue because "the agency was examining the fairness doctrine's lawfulness through
First Amendment lenses." Id. at 674 (Starr, J., concurring).
109. The Solicitor General and FCC claimed that the possibility of legislative restoration of fairness
made it unnecessary for the Supreme Court to review Syracuse Peace Council. "[Tlhe only questions
properly presented are narrow-whether the Communications Act compels the Commission to apply the
fairness doctrine"; a question that could be nullified by the enactment of pending legislation. Brief for
the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 12-13, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990)
(No. 85-1516). Although suggesting that Congress could reimpose fairness, the Commission was correct
in opposing certiorari. Since it was unlikely that the Supreme Court would transform a narrow "public
interest" holding into a broad constitutional pronouncement, the Commission had nothing to gain
through Court review.
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constitutional hesitancy, of course, was a function of politics. The FCC and its
Chair, Mark Fowler, while opposing fairness, sought an appropriate vehicle for
the repeal of fairness with some degree of trepidation."' The FCC's solution
was for the D.C. Circuit to do the Commission's constitutional dirty work for it.
While that tactic did not fully succeed, the Meredith remand created the
appropriate setting for the FCC's repeal of fairness.' Once the Commission
was set to cross that abyss, it proved quite able to launch a full throttle
constitutional attack on fairness. And why not? The constitutional argument
was a powerful one, which, with some luck, might be ratified by the D.C. Circuit.
The approaches of Congress and the White House to the constitutional issue
were more straightforward. The White House chose not to be an active player
in the administration of fairness or other FCC regulatory doctrines. While the
White House sometimes "jawbones" administrative agencies,11 2 the Reagan
White House, while making critical appointments decisions, rarely involved itself
in FCC matters. Its involvement, instead, was limited to signing off or vetoing
legislative action. On fairness, the President fought off legislative efforts on First
Amendment grounds. Congress's involvement was far more pervasive but not
very complex. Congress was concerned with power, not the Constitution. The
FCC's attack on fairness challenged Congress's domain in two ways. First, the
repeal effort was considered a disrespectful end-run around legislative
prerogatives. Second, the substance of the challenge called into question the
appropriateness of "public trustee" regulations of broadcasting. The House and
Senate Commerce Committees, while they could not escape the constitutional
dimensions of this challenge, paid attention to the Constitution only so much as
was necessary to uphold its prerogatives. As it turns out, that was not too often.
For the most part, FCC oversight committees referred to the "public interest,"
not the Constitution.
The last player in this drama, the courts, were somewhat inconsistent in their
invocations of the Constitution. R-TNDA declined to consider the constitutional-
ity of fairness for jurisdictional reasons; Meredith refused to resolve the
constitutional issue itself, but encouraged the Commission to consider the
constitutionality of fairness on remand; Syracuse Peace Council refused to rule
on the constitutional question because of the availability of alternative grounds.
110. Telephone interview with Bruce Fein, FCC General Counsel under Fowler (May 4, 1990); Pitch
interview, supra note 15.
111. In repealing fairness, the Commission placed great emphasis on the D.C. Circuit's rulings in
TRAC and Meredith. For the Commission: "[W]ith the uncertainty of the doctrine's codification
removed [in TRAC], and the Meredith court's directive to consider the constitutional issues, we believe
it is now incumbent upon us to consider the doctrine in terms of the inextricable constitutional issues
upon which the policy rests." In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. at
5062 n.62 (1987). This leveraging of court decisions makes clear that the Commission did not "orphan"
its repeal efforts in the face of legislative opposition. For a competing perspective, see Bloch, supra note
12, at 59-84.
112. See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980).
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The courts prompted the Commission's constitutional holding while refusing to
speak to the issue themselves.
The irony of this battle over fairness is that after years of administrative,
judicial, and legislative conflict, the doctrine may well reemerge. Indeed,
separate versions of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1993 have been
introduced in the House and Senate.11 3 The lesson here is simple but pro-
found. Without the court's backing its claim that the Fairness Doctrine was
unconstitutional, the FCC's administrative constitutional interpretation is as
politically vulnerable as public interest findings. The Fowler and Patrick FCCs
then accomplished very little by invoking the Constitution. Had Syracuse Peace
Council upheld their conclusions on the (un)constitutional status of fairness,
however, the FCC would have made policy more binding than legislation. That
policy, of course, would have limited the reach of FCC authority. For
deregulators, however, the more confining the judiciary, the better the judiciary.
IV
INTERLUDE: RUPERT MURDOCH V. CONGRESS
The battle over fairness was emblematic of other disputes between the FCC
and Congress, with the Commission bowing to marketplace deregulation and the
Congress sticking to public trustee regulation. One of these disputes involved
1975 Commission regulations prohibiting the concurrent ownership of a
newspaper and television station in the same market, regulations rooted in "the
assumption that there is a correlation between additional voices and greater
diversity."" 4 The context of this dispute was an ongoing feud between Rupert
Murdoch and congressional leadership, during which Murdoch convinced the
Commission to temporarily waive the cross-ownership ban and, in turn, the
Congress passed legislation prohibiting the FCC from extending Murdoch's
temporary waiver.
The events began in 1978 with the Supreme Court's approval of the cross-
ownership ban in FCC v. National Citizens Commission for Broadcasting."5
Rejecting First Amendment objections by broadcasters and publishers, the Court
reaffirmed the "fundamental principle" laid down in Red Lion that there is no
"unbridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of
every individual to speak, write, or publish."11 6  Due to the Fowler
Commission's attack on Red Lion and concomitant commitment to broadcasters'
"press" rights, the cross-ownership ban seemed an inevitable target of FCC
"unregulation."
113. See supra note 96.
114. Brief for the FCC at 20, FCC v. National Citizens Comm'n for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978) (No. 76-1471).
115. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
116. Id. at 799 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)).
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Of course, Congress was intensely interested in prohibiting cross-ownership.
In July 1985, hearings were held to "underline, underscore, and emphasize to
people the importance of concentration and cross-ownership." '117 Later that
year, language was included in a conference report and a letter was sent to the
FCC by its oversight committee "that the cross-ownership rules are vitally
important" and that the Commission should review "with greater scrutiny"
requests for waivers to the cross-ownership ban.118 The Commission, up to a
point, heeded these concerns. It elected to put off any challenge to the cross-
ownership rule unless the fairness doctrine was set for repeal. The FCC
nonetheless persisted in granting temporary waivers to cross-ownership. Several
of these waivers were granted to Rupert Murdoch.
Congress liked neither the FCC's willingness to grant temporary waivers nor
Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch, an Australian media mogul who apparently became
a U.S. citizen in order to satisfy federal requirements governing his purchase of
television stations in New York, Boston, and elsewhere, was described on the
Senate floor as "the No. 1 dirt bag owner of any publications or electronic media
in this nation," as "someone who arrived here from Australia ... and goes
around trying to get us to change the rules," and as a "sneaky operat[ive]."" 9
Congress's distaste for Murdoch was a byproduct of the hatchet job his papers,
The New York Post and The Boston Herald, had done to Senator Edward
Kennedy (describing the Senator as immoral, overweight, and floundering),
Senator Earnest Hollings, and other congressional leaders. The FCC, for its part,
gleefully granted temporary waivers to Murdoch's New York and Boston
operations.1 20  Congress, "acute[ly] aware of the[se] requests of Mr.
Murdoch, 12' blew its cool when, in late 1987, the Commission questioned
whether the cross-ownership ban served the public interest and instituted a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to reexamine the ban.12  Following on the
heels of the fairness veto, Congress correctly concluded that the FCC was
positioning itself to extend its fairness repeal to cross-ownership.123
117. Media Mergers and Takeovers: The FCC and the Public Interest, Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in part in 134 CONG. REC. S65 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Wirth).
118. Letter from House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler (Nov. 13, 1985)
[H.R. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 433 (1985)], reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S65 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
1988).
119. 134 CONG REC. S142 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker); Id. at S141
(statement of Sen. Wirth); 134 CONG. REC. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
120. According to one account: "[Mark Fowler] said at his retirement party: 'The greatest gift I
gave to anybody as Chairman of the FCC was an 18-month waiver to Rupert Murdoch.' And everybody
clapped and said 'Whoopee."' 134 CONG. REC. S58 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Hollings).
121. 134 Cong. Rec. S141 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
122. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules, the Broadcast Multiple Ownership
Rules, 2 F.C.C.R. 1138 (1987).
123. Telephone interview with Michael Carvin, former Reagan Justice Department official and
plaintiff's counsel in Lamprecht (Aug. 27, 1992) [hereinafter Carvin interview]. See also News America
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Congress struck back at both Murdoch and the Commission. It enacted a
limitation rider for fiscal year 1988 prohibiting the FCC "to repeal, to retroac-
tively apply changes in, or to begin or continue a re-examination of... or to
extend the time period of current grants of temporary waivers to" the cross-
ownership ban. 24 The rider, for one year at least, killed the FCC re-examina-
tion. The rider also blocked the FCC from extending Murdoch's temporary
waivers in Boston and New York, both due to expire in the 1988 fiscal year.
Since no other temporary waivers were due to expire in 1988, Murdoch was the
only person adversely affected by this proviso.
The rider was at once a political masterstroke and an outrage. Fearing a veto
threat because of Reagan's strong opposition to the cross-ownership ban,1" the
rider was quietly inserted at conference by Senators Kennedy and Hollings into
the massive fiscal year 1988 spending bill only hours before the 471 page bill was
submitted to the Congress for an immediate vote. Its existence was known to
members of the FCC's oversight committees and few others. The President, who
signed the bill only after pushing out the fairness doctrine, did not know of its
existence. Indeed, the "discovery" of the cross-ownership rider did not take
place until several days after enactment. 1
26
Congressional leadership embraced the rider, salvaging some small victory
after their biting defeat over fairness. In Senate debates subsequent to the
enactment of this "sneak attack" limitation rider, Senator Kennedy proclaimed
"our unsatisfactory experience with the FCC and the repeal of the fairness
doctrine" makes the cross-ownership ban's "emphasis on diversity ... more
important than ever.' ' 127  Senator Hollings, in defending his rider spoke in
impassioned tones about his oversight Committee's "struggl[e]" with a "runaway
animal in the FCC," "an administrative arm of the U.S. Congress," which has
nonetheless declared "open season ... in getting rid of nearly any kind of rule
and regulation."" For Senator Hollings, the cross-ownership rider was
reflective of a larger congressional effort to "take [this] administrative body and
bring them in line" through limitation riders prohibiting the FCC's reconsidera-
tion of favored congressional policies.1 29  The supporters of the rider also
defended the prohibition on extensions of Murdoch's temporary waivers.
Admitting that the resolution was "aimed directly" at Murdoch "to insure...
Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing FCC reaction to Murdoch litigation).
124. Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987). For a discussion of the
statutory interpretation issues raised by this rider, see Devins, supra note 95, at 414-21.
125. See Paul Pien & Steven Goodman, Deflecting a "Laser Beam" from Murdoch, LEGAL TIMES,
May 16, 1988, at 17.
126. News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Accord Devins,
supra note 95, at 419.
127. 134 CONG. REC. S143 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
128. 134 CONG. REc. S56 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
129. Id. at S57-58.
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that he wasn't going to abuse the process anymore,""t  Senator Kennedy
nevertheless characterized the rider as a neutral measure designed to prevent
anyone from evading the cross-ownership rule by "obtaining a permanent
exemption in the guise of a series of temporary waivers." 13  He claimed,
"Diversity is the issue .... What [Murdoch] has done is reduce diversity."132
Rupert Murdoch, burned by the Congress, did what any naturalized U.S.
Citizen would do-he sued. In News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, a divided
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Murdoch's First Amendment
challenge to the rider.133 Emphasizing that "only" Murdoch could not "seek
an extension during the fiscal year,"' ' the court concluded that the no-
extensions rider poorly served Congress's purported goal of preserving the cross-
ownership prohibition. Instead, to protect the cross-ownership rule, the court
opined that the FCC should treat initial grants of temporary extensions and
extension renewals alike.
The News America case was revealing on several fronts. At one level, there
were strong parallels to fairness. The FCC, which disliked both the Murdoch
and cross-ownership reconsideration riders, hoped that the D.C. Circuit would
strike a blow to cross-ownership. 135 In contrast to the fairness debate, however,
the FCC had little latitude to question the riders. By statutorily directing the
FCC not to extend temporary waivers, Congress technically compelled the
Commission to defend Murdoch's challenge." 6 Perceiving itself a prisoner of
war forced to denounce its homeland, the Commission's solution to this dilemma
130. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-4, News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (No. 88-1037); Jerry Williams, Sen. Kennedy Clash on Radio, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 8, 1988, at
59.
131. 134 CONG. REC. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
132. Id.
133. 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 814.
135. See infra notes 139-140 and accompanying text. See also Diane S. Killory & Richard J. Bozelli,
Book Review, 40 FED. COM. B.J. 413,415-16 n.8 (1988); Samuel A. Simon & David Wagenhauser, Can
Rupert Murdoch Have it all; Media Cross-Ownership Rules, 246 NATION 181 (Feb. 13, 1988). The
prohibition on the FCC's reexamination of the cross-ownership rule was not directly at issue in News
America. Murdoch's challenge was limited to the temporary extension prohibition. The FCC, however,
obliquely noted in its brief that "[tihe number of media outlets available to a viewer in a given market
might well be a relevant factor in a reevaluation of whether the cross-ownership rule continues to be
necessary to further the public interest, if the Commission were able and willing to undertake such a
reevaluation." Corrected Brief for the FCC at 21 n.6, News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d
800 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1037). At oral argument, moreover, Judge Laurence Silberman (who
ordered the FCC in Meredith to assess the constitutionality of fairness) expressed doubt about the
constitutionality of cross-ownership.
136. Independent agencies perceive that it is politically incumbent upon them to defend legislative
mandates. Telephone interview with Diane Killory, FCC General Counsel under Patrick (Sept. 10,1992)
[hereinafter Killory interview]. The D.C. Circuit also speaks of the "well known principle that regulatory
agencies are not free to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional." Meredith, 809 F.2d at 872.
Nevertheless, during the News America litigation, some political appointees within the Commission hoped
that the Department of Justice-pursuant to the president's power to "take care" that the laws are
faithfully executed-would have insisted that the FCC refuse to defend the Murdoch rider. See generally
Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Congressional Statutes,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1977).
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was to offer a weak defense to the temporary extension rider at issue in News
America. The Commission's brief conceded that the statute was sustainable only
under rational basis scrutiny because "Congress might have been able to pass a
bill that better addressed its fears," "premised" its defense of the rider "on the
assumption that the rider was not impermissibly focused on [Murdoch,]" and
"acknowledged that the legislative history contains conflicting statements" on this
question. 137 When News America was decided in March 1988, the Commission
"applauded" its defeat. "The Court by this decision," FCC Chair Dennis Patrick
said, "has demonstrated that the Congress does not have a free hand in the
regulation of the broadcast press. ' 138
News America, like the fairness debate, also highlighted the crucial role
played by the D.C. Circuit in this area. The conclusion that the temporary
extension rider was purposefully limited to Murdoch was debatable; appropria-
tions riders are necessarily limited to a single fiscal year making Murdoch "a
legitimate class of one" subject to Congress's broader concern of foreclosing
repeated temporary extensions.139  Comments by rider sponsors, admittedly,
cast doubt on this assertion; the choice, however, was for the D.C. Circuit to
make. That it chose to strike down an arguably constitutional act of Congress
provides a glimpse into its self-designated status as a player in administrative
policymaking.' 4
The epilogue to the News America decision also distinguishes cross-ownership
from fairness. On cross-ownership, Congress lost this skirmish but won the
larger battle. Murdoch sold his papers rather than prolong his personal war.
The FCC elected not to prolong its battle over cross-ownership in subsequent
fiscal years.
V
RED LION REDUX: THE FCC's FAILED CHALLENGE TO RACE
PREFERENCES
The power of the judiciary and the executive to settle constitutional disputes
between the Congress and the FCC was again evidenced in FCC efforts to
examine the constitutional propriety of race and other preferences. Unlike
fairness, where the courts and the White House prompted and protected FCC
repeal efforts, the judiciary and the executive ultimately weighed in on the side
of race preferences. Left on its own, the FCC could not overcome congressional
support for race preferences.
137. Corrected Brief, supra note 135, at 32, 33, 43. Fearing such a slip shod defense of the rider,
House leadership directed the General Counsel to the Clerk, Steven R. Ross, to file a brief defending
the Murdoch rider. News America, 844 F.2d at 801.
138. Communications, FCC Applauds Federal Court Decision Striking Down Cross-Ownership Law,
BNA Daily Rept. for Execs., Mar. 31, 1988.
139. This was the view of Judge Spottswood Robinson, who dissented in News America. See also
Devins supra note 95, at 414-21.
140. See D.C. Circuit Symposium, supra note 62.
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The story of FCC race preferences was far more complicated, and far more
bizarre than the above snapshot suggests. While Congress's support for race
preferences did not waiver, the courts, the executive, and the FCC each flip-
flopped so much on this question that it was impossible to know what was up
and what was down until the Supreme Court's 1991 affirmation of FCC race
preferences in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC-a case, incidentally, whose
precedental future is clouded in uncertainty.141 The only way to unscramble
this story is to pay attention to politics and personalities, not constitutional
interpretation.
A. Background: The Rise of Diversity Preferences
The source of the FCC's preference was neither the Congress, the Commis-
sion, nor the White House. Rather, the D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to provide
a comparative preference to racial minorities in order to serve program diversity
objectives. Perceiving that "minority ownership is likely to increase diversity of
content," the race preference was deemed integral to the FCC's responsibility to
promote the "public interest" through its awarding of broadcast licenses.142
The D.C. Circuit Court's 1973 decision, TV 9 Inc. v. FCC, was an appeal of the
FCC's refusal to value minority status in according a broadcast license. The
Nixon Commission's position was that "the Communications Act, like the
Constitution, is color blind. What the Communications Act demands is service
to the public ... and that factor alone must control the licensing processes, not
the race, color or creed of an applicant."143 In other words, the FCC rejected
the minority ownership-diversity programming nexus in 1973.
Through a certiorari petition filed by Solicitor General Robert Bork, the FCC
sought Supreme Court review of TV 9. Despite FCC claims that minority
preferences "raise the most serious constitutional questions" and that the
appellate court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Commis-
sion,1" the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. 45  The Commission
accordingly instructed its administrative law judges to afford comparative merit
to applicants when minority owners were to participate in the operation of the
station.
Program diversity was the exclusive concern of the D.C. Circuit in TV 9."4
In 1977, however, reports prepared for the FCC Conference on Minority
141. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). For my overview and criticism of Metro Broadcasting, see Neal Devins,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125 (1990). As to
Metro's clouded future, see infra, part V, notes 209-28.
142. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
143. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (1972).
144. Petition of the United States for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, Federal Communications Comm'n
v. TV 9, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
145. 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
146. Remedial concerns did, however, play a role in the case when it was before the Commission.
Commissioner Benjamin Hooks advocated a comparative preference to "redress[ ] past injustices." Mid-
Florida Television Corp., 37 F.C.C.2d 559, 560 (1972).
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Ownership revealed that a "systematic series of barriers imped[ed] minority
ownership," including FCC broadcast allocation policies that effectively favored
nonminority concerns.147 In 1978, an FCC Taskforce Report found "the
underrepresentation of minorities in the ownership of broadcast stations" to be
"a direct result of the general societal discrimination."'"
President Carter echoed his appointees' concerns, pointing to "discrimination
and exclusion in the past" as largely responsible for minority underrepresentation
in broadcasting. 4 9 For the White House, the TV 9 comparative hearing
preference was not enough. It successfully lobbied the FCC both to provide tax
breaks to broadcasters who sold their stations to minority owners and to allow
broadcasters, whose qualifications had been called into question and otherwise
could not sell their stations, to sell their licenses at "distress sale" prices to FCC-
approved minority enterprises. 5 ° While the stated purpose of these May 1978
regulations was "to provide a more diverse selection of programming,"' 5' the
Carter FCC preference appeared to be a merger of remedial and diversity
concerns. Specifically, because the underrepresentation of minority owners was
attributable to societal discrimination, the FCC had to remedy that discrimination
to achieve program diversity.
The constitutionality of race preferences was never seriously considered in
either the D.C. Circuit's establishment of the comparative preference in TV 9 or
in the White House-prodded FCC extension of race preferences in 1978. TV 9
simply noted that the FCC may advance the public interest by "consider[ing]
factors which do not find expression in constitutional law."' 52 "Inconsistency
with the Constitution," the court proclaimed without further elaboration, "is not
to be found in a view of our developing national life which accords merit to
Black [applicants]."' 53 The Carter proposal and FCC policy statement did not
even pay lip service to the Constitution. The absence of any reference to equal
protection concerns is striking, for the Supreme Court's consideration of Board
of Regents of the University of California v. Baake had sparked a heated national
debate on the constitutionality of affirmative action."
Congress seemed equally uninterested in the Constitution when it enacted
legislation in 1981 authorizing the FCC to grant licenses through a lottery. In
147. Bar S. Robinson, Achieving Diversity in Media Ownership: Bakke and the FCC, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 231 (1979).
148. MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASKFORCE, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, MINORITY
OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING 7 (1978).
149. Telecommunications Minority Assistance Program, 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 1703, 1704 (Pres.
Carter). See also Telecommunication Minority Assistance Program, 1977-78 PUB. PAPERS 252 (Pres.
Carter).
150. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 981 (1978).
151. Id.
152. TV 9, 495 F.2d at 936.
153. Id.
154. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Baake was decided in June 1978, one month after the issuance of FCC
diversity regulations. The constitutional status of diversity preferences therefore was uncertain at the
time the FCC issued its 1978 Statement.
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order to encourage broadcast diversity through inclusion of a variety of
underrepresented groups, including labor unions and community organizations
as well as women and minorities, the legislation required the FCC to grant these
groups significant preferences.155  That profound First Amendment, due
process, and equal protection concerns were raised by this enactment did not
trouble Congress.15 6 In conference, the lottery provision was added to a catch-all
spending bill without any consideration of these constitutional concerns.
The 1981 FCC (chaired by Mark Fowler) refused to implement the statute,
in part, because of these constitutional concerns. Although supportive of lottery
legislation, the Commission perceived that Congress, not just the Commission,
must find that minorities and women have suffered from discrimination. 157
Congress quickly and without acrimony responded to these constitutional
concerns. Knowing that the Commission supported the lottery legislation,
Congress viewed the FCC's concerns as legitimate and not a constitutional smoke
screen. A second lottery statute was enacted in 1982, which, like the Local
Public Works Act set-aside approved in Fullilove v. Klutznick, limited the
diversity preferences to "Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Alaska Natives,
Asians, and Pacific Islanders." ' Furthermore, the conference report accompa-
nying the bill specified that the racial designation was responsive to the
conferees' finding "that the effects of past inequities stemming from racial and
ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities
in the media of mass communications .. . ."" The dropping of the gender
designation was not explained, although the conferees cryptically noted that
women, labor unions, etc., would receive a preference "if they meet the eligibility
guidelines.'16
Congress and the Commission worked in tandem on the question of race
preferences until 1985. Tax certificate and distress sale initiatives were extended
in 1982 to limited partnerships. 6 Moreover, the Commission endorsed the
1982 lottery statute, although Fowler cautioned that "[t]o diverge from a norm
of color blindness is to foster racial antagonism and to denigrate individual
liberty."162  Finally, and most surprising, FCC regulations implementing the
1984 Cable Communication Act reinstated, despite constitutional objections
155. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 736-37 (1982).
156. These were the conclusions reached by the FCC in its assessment of the statute. See In The
Matter of Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection From Among
Mutually Exclusive Competing Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of
Comparative Hearings, 86 F.C.C.2d 257, 276-77 (1982).
157. Id. at 281.
158. Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259 §§ 115(c)(1)-(2), 96 Stat. 1087,
1094 (1983).
159. H.R. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2287.
160. Id. at 2289.
161. FCC News Release, Rpt. No. 5112, FCC Acts to Increase Minority Participation in
Telecommunications Field, Dec. 3, 1982.
162. In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection From Among
Certain Competing Applications Under Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings,
93 F.C.C.2d 952, 1020 (1983).
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raised by the Department of Justice, affirmative action demands that had earlier
been dropped in conference in order to secure Republican Senate leadership
support. 163
B. From Steele to Bush
Commission support for diversity preferences underwent a sea change in
1984. The triggering event was a challenge to the FCC's awarding of compara-
tive gender preferences, a practice that began in 1978 when the Commission's
Review Board concluded that TV 9's emphasis on diversity of viewpoint based
on group status extended to gender as well as race.1" The gender preference
scheme was never formally endorsed and not especially beloved, and the FCC
proved it an ineffective defense in Steele v. FCC. The Commission's brief cited
but never discussed studies of stereotypical portrayals of women in the broadcast
media; noted that women were "significantly underrepresented in their ownership
of telecommunication facilities" but did not refer to a 1982 study highlighting
female underrepresentation; discussed this 1982 study to explain the "potential
for abuse" in gender preferences because many "female owners of TV stations
are the wives of other station owners"; and distinguished race from gender
preferences because "women have not been excluded from 'the mainstream of
society' to the same extent as racial and ethnic minorities. 165
The Commission, in short, failed to make a convincing case for the necessity
of a gender preference to allow grossly underrepresented female broadcasters to
counteract the negative stereotyping of women perpetuated by the male-
dominated media. The FCC, instead, argued that it was "rational for the
Commission to conclude that the increased participation of women ... would
enhance diversity of viewpoint and diversification of ownership."'" This
defense was inadequate to the task and a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit
invalidated the gender preference.167 Chastising the Commission for its
"questionable" and "offensive". "presumption" that more women broadcasters
would increase program diversity without "offer[ing] any evidence other than
statistical underrepresentation," Judges Edward Tamm and Antonin Scalia
depicted the gender preference as an "experiment in social engineering conceived
seemingly by whim and rationalized by conclusive dicta."'"
163. See Leigh Hermance, Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Regulation Imposed
Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 35 CATm. U. L. REV. 807, 820-28 (1986).
164. Gainesville Media, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 143 (1978).
165. This is the view of former FCC Commissioner Glenn Robinson as well as Mark Fowler's chief
of staff Peter Pitch. Telephone interview with Glenn Robinson (Aug. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Robinson
interview]; Pitch interview, supra note 15. This conclusion is corroborated by the failure of either the
FCC or Congress to respond to the D.C. Circuit's 1992 invalidation of gender preferences. See infra
notes 219-28 and accompanying text.
166. Brief for Appellee at 21 n.10, 22-23, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (No. 84-
1176). A far more aggressive defense of gender preferences was launched by the Bush FCC in
Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
167. Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
168. Id. at 1199.
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It is difficult to know whether the Steele brief was purposefully ineffective.
What is clear is that the Commission was poised to rescind its awarding of race
and gender preferences in broadcast licensing. That is the inescapable conclusion
of the Commission's surprising response to the D.C. Circuit's en banc vacating
of the panel decision in Steele. In vacating Steele on its own initiative and
requesting that the FCC file a supplemental brief on the constitutionality of the
gender preference, the D.C. Circuit invited the FCC to defend the preference
before a more sympathetic en banc hearing.69 The Commission, in September
1986, declined this invitation; it simultaneously filed both a brief contending that
its "current policy of granting race and gender preferences conflicts with
constitutional standards" and a motion to remand so that it could determine
whether it could establish a nexus between the preference scheme and enhanced
diversity above and beyond the "diversity of programming and viewpoint"
produced by "market forces.' 170
The Commission's assertion that it "closely examined the [race and gender]
preference scheme, pursuant to the Court's request, and concluded that it fails to
pass constitutional muster as a tool to enhance diversity"'' enraged Congress.
Within one month of the Commission's remand request, and one week of the
court's granting that request, all five Commissioners and their general counsel
were the subject of "rather unpleasant"'72 hearings. Congressman John Bryant
(D-TX) characterized it as "almost pointless" to work with the Commission;
Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX) referred to the need to draft "FCC proof'
legislation as well as the need to "fight this Commission tooth and nail" on civil
rights; and Congressman Edward Markey (D-MA) labelled the reexamination "a
cloudburst in a storm of suspicion and distrust which seems to hover over this
Commission.' 7
The Commission's efforts to justify the Steele remand by claiming "to be
bound by the Constitution" and the corresponding necessity "to visit upon the
American people ... an analytically sound decision"'74 were flatly rejected as
"legalistic gobbledy gook," "a lot of esoteric, intellectual, whatchamacallit."' '75
"That legal stuff invades my intelligence," said Leland, who claimed instead, that
the FCC has a "responsibility to the humanity of all citizens of this country.'
176
The Congress, with a distaste for the Commission's legalistic arguments, accused
169. Order, Steele v. FCC, No. 84-1176 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1985) reprinted in Minority-Owned
Broadcast Stations: Hearings on the H.R. 5373 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1986)
[hereinafter Steele Hearings].
170. Brief for Federal Communications Commission on Rehearing En Banc at 22-23, Steele v. FCC,
770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See id. at Appendix (motion for remand).
171. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
172. Killory interview, supra note 136.
173. Steele Hearings, supra note 169, at 31, 20, 22.
174. Id. at 36 (testimony of FCC chair Fowler), 39 (testimony of FCC Commissioner Patricia Diaz
Dennis).
175. Id. at 55 (statement of Rep. Swift), 39 (statement of Rep. Leland).
176. Id.
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the FCC of hiding behind adverse court rulings of its own making. Congressman
Allen Swift (D-WA), pointing to FCC action on fairness, cable "must carry"
rules, and diversity, stated, "I simply do not understand how the FCC can go into
court and fail to present the best possible argument.... It seems to me that if
you don't like these policies, you should have the guts to change them.., and
you should send lawyers down to court who will defend them-not take
dives."177
The failure of the FCC to defend its preference scheme when invited to do
so by the en banc panel in Steele, as well as the FCC's decision to reconsider its
comparative race preference scheme in the context of a gender preference
challenge, leaves little doubt that the Commission sought to transform the Steele
dismissal into a principled justification for a complete reexamination of all
diversity preferences."'8 Indeed, to preempt a possible D.C. Circuit ruling
upholding diversity preferences, the FCC also sought remand of a related
challenge to the race-specific distress sale policy. Angry members of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee responded to this action by writing to the
Commission that "[g]iven that Congress has found a 'nexus' does exist, the FCC
is not free to represent to the court that such a finding has not been made, or
that [the] agency's findings are anything other than views that are superseded by
the findings of Congress. "
179
The FCC was oblivious to these congressional demands disguised as
ruminations. Already at war with the Congress over fairness, the FCC perceived
that it had little political capital to lose by going forward with its market-oriented
challenge to diversity preferences. On December 30, the Commission launched
a full-blown inquiry into the sensibility of all diversity preferences on both
constitutional and public policy grounds." °  Like the Fairness Report, this
inquiry would have provided the empirical foundations for the Commission's
final action on diversity. Also, as in the fairness debate, the constitutional and
policy questions were linked. Unless the preferences served diversity, the
preferences failed under both public interest and constitutional criteria.181
Finally, as with fairness, the Commission seemed prepared to engage in
factfinding that would undercut Congress's findings. Indeed, the Commission's
notice of inquiry specifically requested comments on "whether [the FCC] is
bound by, or may rely on, congressional findings of constitutionality until
177. Id. at 54 (statement of Rep. Swift).
178. This was certainly the view of FCC critics. See id. at 70-83 (written FCC responses to oversight
committee questions); Tyrone Brown, The FCC's New Threat to Minority Preferences, WASH. POST, Sept.
26, 1986, at A-27.
179. Quoted in "A Shameful Thing"; NMBC Pledges to Keep Minority Preferences in FCC Rules,
COMM. DAILY, Oct. 28, 1986, at 4.
180. In the Matter of Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and
Tax Certificates Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, F.C.C.R. 1316 (Dec. 30,
1986).
181. Id. at 1317-18.
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directed otherwise by a court, or whether it must independently assess the
constitutional issues."" 2
The FCC's direct attack on legislative factfinding was too much for Congress.
Senator Lautenberg (D-NJ), in introducing legislation to codify diversity
preferences, complained that "[tihe FCC seems to think that it can put itself
above the Congress and above the courts."183  Rather than enacting this
legislation, however, Congress settled on a limitation rider prohibiting the
expenditure of funds "to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to ...
continue a reexamination of the rules of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion" regarding expanding minority and women ownership of broadcasting
licenses."M The Senate report accompanying this rider noted that the FCC
reexamination was "unwarranted" and that the Congress "has found that
promoting diversity of ownership of broadcast properties satisfies important
public policy goals." '185
President Reagan did not blink when he signed this provision as part of the
1987 catch-all spending bill. Although the President had earlier threatened to
veto that bill if it contained fairness provisions, the White House was not at all
exercised over race and gender preferences. That Reagan signed the FCC
funding ban should come as no surprise. The gains from vetoing the funding ban
were few and the costs enormous."M Unlike fairness, the broadcasting industry
did not oppose the preferences. The funding ban, moreover, was a one year
measure that might be judicially struck down as a result of ongoing constitutional
challenges. With no apparent gains, there was little incentive for the President
to wage war with powerful civil rights interests. This is especially true since
Ronald Reagan did not philosophically oppose race preferences as he did content
restrictions on broadcasters. Despite all of his campaign rhetoric, Reagan did
little to stand in the way of affirmative action."l Granted, his Justice Depart-
ment vigorously opposed race preferences; however, outside of court, the
Administration left in place several of its predecessor's most controversial
programs and policies. The Administration, moreover, was outspoken in its
support of set-aside programs designed to increase minority business owner-
ship.1"
182. Id. at 1318.
183. 133 CONG. REc. S5494 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1987) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
184. Continuing Appropriations, FCC Salaries and Expenses, P.L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-32
(1987).
185. S. REP. No. 182, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987). The Senate Report also "instruct[ed] the
Commission" to defend race preferences in several pending D.C. Circuit cases. Id. at 77.
186. Fein interview, supra note 25. Interview with Toni Cook, Staff Members-Communications,
Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee (June 2, 1992) (hereinafter Cook interview).
187. See Jeremy Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 55; HERMAN
BELz, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACrION (1991); Chester
E. Finn, Jr., "Affirmative Action" Under Reagan, COMMENTARY, April 1982, at 17.
188. See Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 TEx. L. REv. 353 (1989). See also sources
supra note 187.
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The FCC funding ban, while drafted by the Congress and approved by the
President, did not, of course, foreclose judicial review of the diversity preferenc-
es. By forbidding FCC reexamination of the diversity preference, however, the
rider forced the Reagan FCC, under Patrick, to defend the Carter-era initiatives.
The FCC did so, portraying the program as an appropriate mechanism to
advance First Amendment diversity concerns. The FCC declined to make the
argument that the preference could also be supported as a remedial measure.
Instead, the Commission maintained that its "goal in implementing the
preferences policy has not been to remedy discrimination against minorities or
to provide remedial benefits."189 The commission was not bothered that its
eschewing of remedial concerns made its argument constitutionally suspect; the
rider did not mandate that diversity preferences be defended "at all costs."'"
With the election of George Bush, however, the FCC once again changed its
position on race preferences. President Bush, seeking to normalize relations
between the FCC and Congress, distanced himself from the Reagan Administra-
tion. His three FCC appointees, Alfred Sikes, Sherrie Marshall and Andrew
Barnett, all expressly supported the use of preferences in the awarding of
broadcast licenses during their confirmation hearings. 1" Before the Supreme
Court, moreover, the Commission argued that diversity preferences served "the
compelling governmental interests of promoting diversity in broadcast program-
ming and remedying discrimination.""
C. The Metro Broadcasting Decision
The constitutionality of the FCC's awarding of distress sale and comparative
hearing preferences to racial minorities ultimately made its way to the Supreme
Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.93 Before the Court, the Congress,
the FCC, and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") each offered their competing
institutional perspectives. Distrustful of FCC representation, the Congress,
through the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel, separately argued that the
preferences were legislatively mandated and intended "to overcome past
inequities and to advance a legitimate public interest in diversity of program-
ming.' 94 The FCC advanced identical arguments. However, the Bush DOJ
opposed the FCC in Metro Broadcasting. Characterizing the diversity preference
as "precisely the type of racial stereotyping that is anathema to basic constitu-
189. Brief for the FCC, Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (No.
85-1755).
190. Pitch interview, supra note 15.
191. See Nominations-July: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 341 (1989) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes); id. at 365 (statement of
Andrew Barrett); id. at 380 (statement of Sherrie Marshall).
192. Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 27, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990) (No. 89-453).
193. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
194. Brief for the U.S. Senate as Amicus Curiae at 2, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990) (No. 89-453).
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tional principles," the DOJ's arguments in Metro were indistinguishable from
Reagan Administration attacks on race preferences.195 Nonetheless, rather
than exercise his power as sole government litigator before the Supreme Court
in FCC licensing cases, Bush's Solicitor General Kenneth Starr allowed the FCC
to serve as the government's principal voice in the case.1 6
Why the Bush administration, through the DOJ and the FCC, presented
conflicting arguments before the Supreme Court is unclear. One explanation is
that the President was caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one
hand, his desire to stabilize FCC-Congress relations necessitated formal FCC
support for the program. On the other hand, his ostensible opposition to race
preferences also demanded a formal repudiation of the program.
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court sided with the Congress and the
Commission, upholding FCC race preferences in Metro Broadcasting. In
approving these programs, the Court did not demand a finding that the
preferences would remedy particularized discrimination by the FCC. The Court,
moreover, did not think it significant that the preferences were responsive to
societal discrimination which limited opportunities for minority broadcasters.
Concluding that deference was owed Congress's employment of race because of
its "institutional competence as the national legislature," Metro Broadcasting
found it unnecessary to employ a remedial constraint."9 Instead, the Court
held that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress--even if those
measures are not 'remedial' . . .- are constitutionally permissible to the extent
that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.""19
Under this standard of review, the Court had little difficulty upholding the
FCC plan. First, although the funding ban did not statutorily mandate diversity
preferences, the Court concluded that Congress "has made clear its view that
minority ownership policies advance the goal of diverse programming. ' "
Second, referring to a slew of cases upholding FCC regulation of broadcasters
to ensure the "widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources," the Court found broadcast diversity "at the very least" an
important governmental objective.2 °° Third, although neither Congress nor the
FCC ever sought to prove the nexus between minority ownership and diversity
broadcasting, the Court noted that "[w]ith respect to this 'complex' empirical
195. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Ashroline Communications Co. v. Shuberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453).
196. For an analysis of Solicitor General-FCC relations in Metro Broadcasting, see Neal Devins,
Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control of Independent Agency Litigation, - CAL. L.
REV. [forthcoming publication on file with author].
197. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990).
198. Id. at 563-64.
199. Id. at 571.
200. Id. at 569.
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question, we are required to give 'great weight to the decisions of Congress and
the experience of the Commission.""'2 1
The Metro Broadcasting Court's approval of the FCC preference shocked the
Congress, the Commission, and the Solicitor General's office.' After the
Court's 1989 Richmond v. Croson.3 decision, there was reason to think that
a firm conservative majority dominated the Court on the race preference
issue.' The real surprise of Metro Broadcasting, however, was not its
outcome. Prior cases amply supported the federal government's use of race to
remedy societal discrimination.2 5 Accordingly, the FCC and the U.S. Senate,
in briefs filed before the Court, characterized the preference as a congressionally
mandated remedy.2' The Court did not travel this paved road. Instead, it
elected to make the focus of its inquiry the nonremedial objective of promoting
program diversity through increasing minority ownership.
The key to this mystery is Justice Byron White. White, who had earlier
demanded that race preference programs both satisfy strict scrutiny review and
remedy proven discrimination, provided the critical fifth vote in Metro
Broadcasting.7 White, however, was also the author of Red Lion and held
strong beliefs about the continued correctness of that decision. Whether White
was personally offended by FCC efforts to publicly repudiate one of his most
important decisions is unknown. What is known is that White hinged his Metro
Broadcasting vote on the Court's adoption of a diversity rationale. According
to Justice William Brennan's personal records and conversations between
Brennan and his biographer Stephen Wermiel, White refused to sign onto a
Brennan-drafted opinion upholding the preferences on remedial grounds and
insisted that the majority base its opinion on Red Lion's endorsement of
diversity-based broadcast regulation.2"
201. Id. at 570.
202. Cook interview (Congress) supra note 186; Killory interview (FCC), supra note 136; Telephone
interview with Tom Merrill, former Deputy Solicitor General (Aug. 20, 1992).
203. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
204. See Devins supra note 188, at 360.
205. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980) (upholding a remedial set-aside enacted
by Congress); Croson, 488 U.S. 480, at 484 (discussing and distinguishing Fullilove from set-asides
enacted by state and local government).
206. Brief of the U.S. Senate, supra note 194, at 2 ("The interest of the Senate in this case is
grounded in the conviction that the legislation [that] Congress has enacted to required the continuation
of the FCC's policy is a measured and constitutional effort to overcome past inequities and to advance
the legitimate public interest in diversity of programming.") (emphasis added); Brief for Federal
Communications Commission at 16, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453)
("The minority enhancement and other statutory policies that seek to further minority ownership of
broadcast stations should also be viewed as an effort by Congress to remedy the effects of past
discrimination.") (emphasis added). The Red Lion issue, despite its obvious relevance to diversity
preference, caught everyone by surprise. In its brief opposing diversity preferences, the Solicitor General
refers only once to Red Lion in the wake of the FCC's fairness repeal. Brief for the United States, supra
note 195, at 31 ("It is thus far from clear that the interest in promoting 'program diversity' is sufficiently
compelling to justify the use of racial classifications.").
207. White, for example, endorsed strict review in Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
208. Telephone interview with Stephen Wermiel (Oct. 20, 1992).
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D. Summary
Metro Broadcasting's approval of the FCC preferences was a dramatic
chapter in a twenty-five-year story of confrontational and often acrimonious
exchanges between the courts, the Congress, the White House, and the FCC.
Metro also reveals that the courts played the dominant role in this drama: first
by ordering race preferences in 7V 9, next by raising doubts about the FCC
preferences in Steele, and finally by reaffirming the FCC preferences in Metro.
The FCC certainly recognized this judicial role. Rather than question the
constitutionality of preferences on its own initiative, the FCC waited for some
judicial signal. Once that signal was delivered, the Fowler FCC tried to replicate
its fairness strategy to strike down the preferences. Unlike fairness, however,
Congress enacted a limitation rider which preempted FCC factfinding and forced
the FCC to defend the preferences in court. The key to this legislative victory
was the Reagan White House's willingness to approve preferences. Clearly, had
the White House opposed preferences with the same vehemence that it opposed
fairness, the FCC would have been able to administratively repeal the preference
program by dispelling the presumption that race preferences provide greater
program diversity than unregulated market forces.
The FCC's unwillingness to advance its constitutional claims without the
shibboleth of a court mandate proved its undoing. Congress was able to launch
an effective counteroffensive before the FCC could accomplish its desired
objective. Congress's counterattack also reveals that the legislature was
disinterested in the "gobbledy gook" of constitutional arguments. Although
rightly distrusting the FCC, Congress had no interest in assessing the race
preference-broadcast diversity nexus and, with it, the constitutional soundness of
the diversity program. Congress's sole concern was protecting a program it
supported and reasserting its power over the FCC.
The saga of FCC race preferences again reveals that constitutional
interpretation often runs a poor second to political reality. The FCC was
circumspect in its invocation of the Constitution. The Congress seemed
unconcerned with the Constitution. The Reagan and Bush White Houses offered
conflicting constitutional messages-arguing against preferences in court while
supporting preferences through legislation and administrative appointments.
VI
FINALE: JUDGE THOMAS AND GENDER PREFERENCES
The most surprising chapter in FCC-congressional relations is the demise of
gender preferences in the granting of broadcast licenses. Following Metro
Broadcasting, the fate of gender preferences seemed secure. Congressional
action preserving FCC race preferences, so important to Metro's validation of
race preferences, applied with equal force to gender preferences. Moreover,
Bush's FCC appointees accepted gender preferences and would rather have
defended these preferences than do battle with Congress over them. In the
topsy-turvy world of communications policymaking, however, things do not play
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out according to Hoyle. The wild card here was a renegade panel of the D.C.
Circuit which placed gender preferences outside the reach of Metro Broadcasting.
The pivotal player in this episode was Clarence Thomas. On February 19,
1992, Associate Justice Thomas returned to the D.C. Circuit to issue his most
controversial appellate court decision, Lamprecht v FCC.2 9 Argued in January
1991, Lamprecht played a significant part in the Thomas confirmation hearings.
Following the Senate Judiciary Committee's substantive questioning of Thomas,
a September 30, 1991 Legal Times story reported that Thomas's stated
willingness to live with Metro Broadcasting was misleading because he had
drafted an opinion invalidating FCC gender preferences. 210 When Lamprecht
was issued, according to D.C. Circuit Judge James Buckley, it "demonstrate[d]
the general accuracy of the information divulged to The Legal Times.)21
Lamprecht struck down the gender preference because the FCC, both in its
brief and at oral argument, failed to support its predictive judgment that a nexus
exists between female ownership and program diversity.2 12 Furthermore, the
only study "either inside or outside the legislative record" revealed that "women
are just one and one quarter times [125%] as likely [as men] to broadcast
women's programming. '  That report's conclusion that "women station
ownership result[s] in a greater degree of minority programming" did not
matter.2" 4 Likewise, it did not matter that D.C. Circuit Judge Abner Mikva
found the degree of correlation more than sufficient to support the preference,
stating, "[T]he line that we draw is neither more nor less principled than the line
that he draws; our lines are merely grounded in a different exercise of
judgment., 21 1
Lamprecht was truly remarkable. It took aim at the FCC, the Congress, and
Metro Broadcasting. FCC efforts to defend the gender preference by pointing
to Metro Broadcasting, Congress's affirmation of the ownership-broadcast
diversity nexus, Civil Rights Commission reports on sex stereotyping in
broadcasting, and FCC studies on the underrepresentation of women broadcast-
ers were rejected out of hand.216 Instead, Lamprecht chided Congress for
prohibiting the Commission from assessing the validity of the presumed
209. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
210. Specter Questioned Thomas about Metro, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 1991, at 20.
211. 958 F.2d at 403 (Buckley, concurring). Several members of Congress concurred in Buckley's
assessment and used Lamprecht to question Justice Thomas's integrity.
212. 958 F.2d at 395.
213. Id. at 396, 397. That study was a 1988 Congressional Research Service Report, Minority
Broadcast Station Ownership and Broadcast Programming: Is There a Nexus?
214. Congressional Research Service Report, supra note 213, at cover page. D.C. Circuit Judge
Abner Mikva, dissenting in Lamprecht, cited this CRS Report language. 958 F.2d at 412 (Mikva,
dissenting).
215. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 398 n.9.
216. Brief for the FCC at 34-41, Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 88-1395).
The FCC was far more forceful in its advancement of gender preferences in Lamprecht that in Steele.
See supra text accompanying note 168. Lamprecht did not cite evidence calling into question the
propriety of gender preferences; Lamprecht discussed at length evidence of female underrepresentation
and sex-stereotyping in broadcasting.
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ownership-diversity nexus in its reexamination of race and gender preferenc-
es."' The Supreme Court was also not immune from Lamprecht (perhaps
because its author, who technically sat on both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court when the opinion was issued, recognized that the Metro decision's
precedental force was limited by his presence on the Court). Rather than
reassert the Metro decision's emphasis on the "overriding significance" of
congressional action and findings, Lamprecht cited out of context language in
Metro that courts ought not to "'defer to the judgment of Congress and the
Commission on a constitutional question.' ' 218
Lamprecht's demand that the diversity nexus must stand on hard evidence
and not presumptive analysis was not unreasonable, but it was at odds with
Metro. With Congress and the FCC ostensibly behind the preference, a Supreme
Court appeal and nexus-affirming factfinding at both the Commission and the
Congress certainly seemed in order. Lamprecht, however, remains intact. No
judicial, administrative, or legislative efforts have been launched to restore
gender preferences. The explanation is that gender preferences lack a powerful
proponent. While neither Congress nor the Commission would repeal these
preferences, there is little interest in fighting for their reinstatement in the face
of an adverse court ruling.
The source of the gender preference, a 1978 FCC review board decision, was
never ratified by the Commission; instead, the Commission ruled that women
should receive a downgraded comparative hearing preference. 219 The Commis-
sion, moreover, refused to extend distress sale and tax certificate preferences to
women, concluding that they have not suffered discrimination "of the same
order" as racial minorities.22 Commission complacency as to the plight of
female underrepresentation was also revealed in FCC opposition to legislatively
specified gender preferences in the first lottery statute. In direct contradiction
to its diversity-based comparative hearing preference, the FCC attacked the
validity of gender preferences "not enacted as compensation for past discrimina-
tion." '221 After Congress dropped the gender specification in its second lottery
217. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 385. It did not matter that Congress's foreclosing of the FCC's
reexamination was rooted in the purported belief that "[d]iversity of ownership results in diversity of
programming and improved service to minority and women audiences." Id. at 391.
218. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 391 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,570 (1990)).
In Metro, the Court deemphasized its reviewing role by setting against the language cited in Lamprecht
the "great weight" owed and the "close attention" that must be given to Congress and FCC "expertise"
on the nexus issue. 497 U.S. at 570. Lamprecht, instead, sets off its recognition that "great weight" be
given to the decisions of Congress and the FCC with the admonition that the courts cannot shirk their
reviewing role. 958 F.2d at 391.
219. The review board decision is Gainesville Media Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 143 (1978). The relative
downgrading of gender preferences by the Commission is discussed in the original Steele brief. See Brief,
at 12, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (No.84-1176) ("women have not been excluded from
'the mainstream of society' to the same extent as racial and ethnic minorities and therefore are entitled
to less significant comparative merit under integration.")
220. National Telecommunications & Info. Admin., 69 F.C.C.2d 1592, 1593 n.8 (1978). The Carter
White House likewise only endorsed race preferences. See sources supra note 149.
221. 88 F.C.C.2d at 491.
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statute, the Commission concluded that women did not meet alternative
eligibility requirements without the benefit of a factfinding proceeding.222 The
FCC never launched such a factfinding effort. The story of FCC rulemaking in
this area is one of indifference. Most Commission efforts were directed at
limiting the reach of gender preferences, suggesting, as former Commissioner
Glen Robinson put it, that the Commission considers these preferences a
"nuisance.'
Congress also seemed ambivalent about gender preferences. While including
gender in the first lottery statute, Congress did not blink at dropping the gender
specification in the second lottery statute in order to preserve race preferenc-
es.224 Congress's outrage at the FCC's reexamination of its diversity preferenc-
es likewise focused on the preservation of race preferences. In both instances,
Congress appeared somewhat sympathetic to gender preferences, but far more
interested in race preferences. Interest group politics played a large role in
explaining this differential treatment. Minority broadcasters are a well
organized, powerful lobby which is on record opposing preference points for
"white women applicants."2' Women broadcasters are disorganized with
relatively little political influence.226
Congress's and the FCC's passivity in the face of Lamprecht is readily
understandable in the context of past legislative and administrative action. By
not seeking en banc review of Lamprecht, the Commission appeared comfortable
with the defeat of gender preferences. The FCC, therefore, had nothing to gain
by launching a factfinding effort or requesting Supreme Court review of
Lamprecht. Moreover, Congress had little incentive to pressure the FCC to seek
Court review or undertake a factfinding hearing. An FCC unsympathetic to
gender preferences was unlikely to substantiate the ownership-diversity
nexus.227 Supreme Court review, furthermore, risked the overturning of Metro
Broadcasting and, with it, race preferences. Aside from these disincentives, the
FCC's oversight committees also had an agenda, too crowded to deal with the
peripheral concern of gender preferences.22
Gender preferences died a sudden, unexpected, and quiet death at the hands
of the D.C. Circuit. Aside from Clarence Thomas's participation in the case,
Lamprecht may have gone by unnoticed, despite the fact that Lamprecht
undermines a landmark Supreme Court ruling, and declares unconstitutional a
congressionally mandated and FCC-approved preference scheme. Without strong
222. See Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 95 F.C.C.2d 432 (1983).
223. Robinson interview, supra note 165. Accord Carvin interview, supra note 123.
224. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
225. See Rivera Makes Commitment to NMBC, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 23, 1984, at 1; TRAC Alleges
Fowles Has Shown "Clear and Unalterable Bias," COMM. DAILY, Mar. 23, 1984, at 1. Hill staffers and
Commission officials both consider minority broadcasters a powerful interest and women broadcasters
a comparatively unimportant interest. Crowell interview, supra note 3; Pitch interview, supra note 15.
226. See supra note 225.
227. Crowell interview, supra note 3.
228. Id. Congress's principal concern during the spring and summer of 1992 was a massive cable
television bill.
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FCC, congressional, or interest group support, the gender preference issue was
politically unimportant. The questionable intrusion of a federal court into
legislative and administrative affairs did not raise the stakes. The bottom line
was not constitutional prerogatives, but specific policy outcomes.
VII
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
Fairness, cross-ownership, and diversity preferences are stories of power.
Each of these battles reflected two fundamental challenges launched by the
Fowler and Patrick Commissions to Congress's authority over broadcasting.
First, the FCC raised doubts about public trustee regulations rooted in spectrum
scarcity. Pointing both to technological advances and the longstanding economic
argument that the "price mechanism ... allocates resources to users without the
need for government regulation," 9 the Commission advocated the substitution
of marketplace solutions for existing regulations. Second, in challenging the
legislatively favored regulatory regime, the Commission questioned Congress's
power both to regulate broadcasting and to govern the Commission. Congress
neither appreciated nor tolerated these broadsides. Rather, it badgered the
Commission with angry letters and oversight hearings, and sought to stymie
Commission initiatives through appropriations riders and, where necessary,
freestanding legislation.
The political battles between the FCC and the Congress were unusually fierce
but, in the context of the Reagan Administration's broader attack on the
administrative state, not unusual. What sets these battles apart is the paramount
role played by constitutional interpretation in their resolution. The FCC's free
market challenge to public trustee regulation rejected the scarcity based
distinction between the broadcast and print press and, with it, the presumption
that government regulation yields greater broadcast diversity than do market
forces. With that said, the Constitution did not figure prominently in either the
FCC's regulatory challenge or Congress's counterattack. Constitutionalism was
of only incidental importance to the Congress and the Commission, as baggage
which necessarily accompanied free market attacks on, and public trustee
justifications of, broadcast regulation.
The forms that constitutional arguments took bespeaks their secondary status.
The FCC did not think constitutional arguments were sufficiently different from
"public interest" claims to risk the wrath of Congress by repealing disfavored
regulations as constitutionally infirm. Initial constitutional doubts about the
fairness doctrine and cross-ownership lay on the periphery while the FCC
questioned whether these regulations served the "public interest.""2  Diversity
229. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 14 (1959).
230. In News America, the FCC--smarting from its fight with Congress over fairness-went so far
as to say that only reexamination of cross-ownership would be limited to the "public interest" issue and
not correlative constitutional concerns. See Corrected Brief for the FCC, supra note 135, at 21 n.6.
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preferences were never depicted as constitutionally suspect until gender
preferences were struck down by the Steele panel decision. The FCC, put simply,
did not see its oath to defend the Constitution adequate to the task of justifying
its repeal of troublesome regulations.
The Commission's lack of constitutional fortitude is readily understandable.
It was considered politically impossible to fight Congress on every matter with
which the Commission preferred deregulation to regulation. The risk of political
fallout was just too great. These risks were heightened by the FCC's indepen-
dent agency status. Lacking the authority or prestige of a co-equal branch, the
Commission felt constrained to challenge the constitutionality of programs that
were congressionally approved but not statutorily mandated. Congress,
moreover, placed greater demands on the Commission to follow its lead,
precisely because the Commission was deemed an "arm of Congress," not part
of the executive.
The Commission, in certain respects, operated within these constraints. It
never sought to constitutionally repeal congressionally favored programs without
some signal from the courts. In other words, rather than take the political heat
for Commission-initiated constitutional repeals, the FCC sought political shelter
in court edicts. The Commission's challenge then was to create the circumstanc-
es in which the courts would raise doubts about the constitutionality of
disfavored programs. On fairness, the Commission called the doctrine into
question with its 1985 Report and invited the courts to come in for the kill with
its arguments in Meredith and R-TNDA. On cross-ownership and diversity
preferences, the Commission appeared to have set the stage for judicial
invalidation through its questionable advocacy in News America and Steele.
The D.C. Circuit-albeit with several caveats-assisted the Commission in its
efforts. Meredith set in motion the fairness repeal; Steele prompted the
reexamination of race and gender preferences. There is no doubt that the
Commission sought to capitalize on these technically adverse rulings. Remand
proceedings were launched in Meredith before the intervenor's request for en
banc review was denied. More significantly, the en banc vacating of Steele did
not prompt the Commission to defend gender preferences; instead, the FCC
argued the necessity of its reexamination of all diversity preferences. This Steele
inspired reexamination is all the more striking, since the Steele panel found the
"Commission's authority to adopt minority preferences ... clear." 231
Commission efforts to cloak their deregulatory initiatives in the garb of court
mandated constitutional analysis were rejected out of hand by the Commission's
oversight committees in Congress. The House Energy and Commerce
Committee, as one staffer observed, "doesn't listen to legal arguments, just
ideology." 2 "Power, not legal training [or a good legal argument], is the most
231. Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
232. Quoted in Miller, supra note 2, at 22.
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important thing on Commerce. '"" For these members of Congress, Commis-
sion retorts to the Constitution were deemed "legalistic gobbledygook."'
Indeed, the Commission was accused of cowardice for "tak[ing] dives" in court
so that it could bootstrap its deregulatory agenda to court decisions. Congress's
intolerance for the niceties of constitutional analysis is also reflected in the
enactment of limitation riders preventing the FCC from assessing the constitu-
tional wisdom of cross-ownership and diversity preferences through factfinding.
This discounting of constitutional analysis reveals the obvious: The principal
concerns of the FCC's overseers was the preservation of their favored policies
and their authority. By the same token, when its institutional priorities or
prestige was not on the table, Congress did not rise in arms to oppose
constitutional interpretations with which it disagreed. For example, since the
FCC supported its objectives, Congress readily responded to constitutional
objections raised by the FCC to the first lottery statute. Congress's failure to
respond to Lamprecht is another example. It did not matter that Lamprecht
struck down legislatively mandated gender preferences, since Congress was not
threatened by the decision. Gender preferences were conscientiously defended
by the FCC and were without a strong advocate in Energy and Commerce. In
sharp contrast, Congress's power over the FCC was challenged by the repeal of
fairness, the granting of a temporary waiver to Murdoch, and the Steele
reexamination. Congress, unable to strongarm the FCC through hearings, letters,
and other oversight techniques, was forced to respond to these perceived power
grabs through legislation codifying fairness and constraining FCC efforts to
repeal diversity preferences and cross-ownership.
Congress's reliance on legislation to check the FCC thrust the White House
into this conflict. On fairness, President Reagan sided with his Justice
Department and Commission appointees, successfully fighting off codification on
First Amendment grounds. On diversity preferences, however, Reagan parted
company from Justice Department court arguments and signed appropriations
measures restricting FCC reexamination. This selective attentiveness to
constitutional concerns is readily understandable in personal and political terms.
Reagan, a former broadcaster, cared much more about content-based fairness
restrictions than some idealized color-blind constitution. The political costs of
upsetting civil rights interests when a pending court decision might well strike
down diversity preferences, moreover, did not warrant a veto of the reexamina-
tion funding ban.
The president, of course, plays a much larger role in defining the contours of
the "constitutional dialogues" between Congress and the Commission than by
simply signing or vetoing legislation. The president appoints the FCC's
233. Id.
234. See Steele Hearings, supra note 175, at 55. As one Energy and Commerce staffer explained,
"[rather than] getting bogged down in fruitless debate over the possible constitutionality of the bills
before them[,] [t]he Energy and Commerce Committee is quite willing to take chances on passing
possibly unconstitutional legislation." Quoted in Miller, supra note 2, at 24.
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commissioners. Reagan's impact is best revealed in a letter signed by former
commissioners attacking his appointees' repeal of fairness. Bush's impact, in
contrast, is evidenced by his appointment of Commissioners who disavowed their
predecessors' constitutional attacks on race and gender preferences in order to
curry favor with their Congressional overseers. Ironically, Bush's Solicitor
General (and former D.C. Circuit judge) Kenneth Starr kept faith with political
conservatives and battled the Bush Commission before the Supreme Court. That
Bush appointees-representing different constituencies-opposed each other in
Metro Broadcasting, once again, reveals the primacy of politics over constitution-
al interpretation.
Metro Broadcasting also reveals that the kingpin in the struggle between free
market deregulation and public trustee regulation is neither the FCC, the
Congress, nor the executive. It is the judiciary. Rather than the Supreme Court,
however, the pivotal judicial player is the D.C. Circuit. All FCC rulemaking and
licensing decisions are subject to D.C. Circuit review. Consequently, the D.C.
Circuit has evolved into a judicial overseer of the FCC. The persistence of D.C.
Circuit intervention is revealed in the frequency with which that court reverses
or remands FCC action. According to a 1988 Congressional Research Service
memorandum, the D.C. Circuit, from January 1986 to January 1988, rejected
Commission arguments in 22 of 88 cases.235
The D.C. Circuit's activism and political awareness is a constant theme of the
battles over fairness, cross-ownership, and diversity preferences. On fairness, the
Commission was explicitly accused of playing judicial politics in both TRAC and
Meredith.36 TRAC, moreover, eschewed FCC arguments that fairness was
inapplicable to teletext in order to find that fairness was not statutorily
mandated. Meredith likewise encouraged the Commission to assess the
constitutional wisdom of fairness, despite the fact that the remand could have
been framed on narrow public interest grounds. Syracuse Peace Council offered
a different type of activism. Rather than decide the constitutional question that
Meredith invited, the court rewrote the FCC repeal in order to duck the
constitutional question.
The resolution of cross-ownership and diversity preferences was also framed
by D.C. Circuit activism. On cross-ownership, News America, reflecting panel
members doubts about the constitutionality of cross-ownership, struck down the
temporary waiver restriction when it could have easily viewed Murdoch as a
legitimate class of one. On race preferences, TV-9 paid short shrift to
constitutional concerns in establishing comparative hearing preferences. On
gender preferences, Lamprecht severely undermined the Supreme Court's Metro
Broadcasting decision in order to invalidate congressionally mandated and FCC-
approved preferences.
235. See Memorandum from Janice E. Rubin to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance (on file with author).
236. Meredith Co. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987); TRAC v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 n.5
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The political and ideological calculations of the FCC, the Congress, the White
House, and the courts defined the battles over fairness, cross-ownership, and
diversity preferences. Constitutional argumentation played a critical but
secondary role in these battles. Ironically, with court decisions and FCC rulings
speaking to the constitutionality of diversity preferences and fairness, the
constitutional appropriateness of diversity, cross-ownership, and fairness remains
up for grabs. Metro Broadcasting and Lamprecht rest their competing holdings
on the presence or absence of proof that diversity in ownership spawns diversity
in programming. FCC and/or congressional factfinding can strengthen or
undermine the ownership-programming nexus and, with it, the continued
correctness of these decisions. The fairness repeal (as well as its probable
reinstatement by Congress) also lies on hotly disputed findings about the costs
of fairness to program diversity. Finally, the cross-ownership policy relies on the
unproven assumption that diversity of ownership yields diversity of programming.
This factual predicate is also subject to challenge.
There is a certain appropriateness to this constitutional uncertainty. Battles
over fairness, cross-ownership, and diversity preferences were not searches for
constitutional truth. These were battles over competing policy visions and the
division of power between Congress and the Commission. That these political
battles should continue on into the future seems only fitting.
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